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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Supreme Court Clerk 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Gold Standard. Inc. v. American Barrick, et. al. 
Case No. 890205 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
On February 9, 1990, Gold Standard submitted supplemental 
authority, purportedly concerning "whether information obtained 
outside of the formal discovery process can be regulated by a 
protective order . . ." Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), defendants Texaco 
and Getty respond to Gold Standard's supplemental filing by 
providing the court with cases that have found that a trial court 
does have authority to regulate "informal" discovery under Civ. P. 
Rule 26(b). 
Durflinaer v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984). 
Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 549 A.2d 950, 959 
(1988) . 
Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857, 864-65 
(1985). 
These citations respond to Gold Standard's letter and further 
support Texaco's and Getty's argument in its Brief at Section IV., 
pp. 46-49. 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter. 
BJR:pls 
Enclosures 
cc: James S. Lowrie, Esq. 
Gordon L. Roberts, Esq 
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ceeds is delayed through no fault of the 
debtor. See Thorsby v. Babcock. 36 Cal.2d 
202, 222 P.2d 863 (1950). The California 
and Oregon statutes are similar in relevant 
respects. Both require reinvestment within 
a fixed period of time; neither explicitly 
provides for tolling of that period pending 
receipt of the proceeds. Both the Oregon 
and the California Supreme Courts have 
held that the homestead exemption is to be 
construed liberally and against forfeiture. 
See id.; DeHaven & Son Hardware v. 
Schultz, 122 Or. 493. 496, 259 P. 778 (1927). 
We decline to hold at this time, however, 
that Oregon courts must follow Thorsby. 
That issue should be considered in the first 
instance by the district court. 
We cannot determine whether White sat-
isfies the third requirement. Neither the 
bankruptcy court nor the district court de-
termined whether he held the proceeds with 
the intent to reinvest them in another 
homestead. The district court shall also 
address this issue upon remand. 
REVERSED and REMANDED for fur-
ther proceedings. 
fa | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Irvin L. DURFLINGER, Raymond Dur-
flinger, and Ronald Durflinger, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Benjamin ARTILES, Preciosa Rosales, 
and Eduardo Medrano, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Kansas Psychiatric Association, 
Amicus Curiae. 
No. 81-1744. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Jan. 27, 1984. 
Decedents* husband and father, on be-
half of himself and his surviving sons, 
brought wrongful death action against hos-
pital and physicians who participated in de-
cision to discharge patient who thereafter 
killed plaintiff's wife and son. Following 
jury verdict for plaintiff, the defendants 
moved for new trial. The United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas, 
Frank G. Theis, Chief Judge, 563 F.Supp. 
322, denied motion, and defendants appeal-
ed. After receiving answer certified to 
Kansas Supreme Court, 234 Kan. 484, 673 
P.2d 86, the Court of Appeals, William E. 
Doyle, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) clinical 
psychologist was competent to testify on 
proper standards applicable to decision to 
discharge patient; (2) trial judge's exclu-
sion of one of defendants' proffered experts 
was justified due to defendants' violation of 
discovery provisions of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (3) defendants' theory of 
contributory negligence was not valid; and 
(4) admission of videotape of patient, which 
was made during his confession to police on 
day of murders, was not erroneous. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>2011 
Federal Courts <s=>823 
Decisions on relevance of testimony 
and competence of witness are within broad 
discretion of trial judge and will only be 
reversed on showing of abuse of discretion. 
2. Evidence <s=>538 
Where physicians were members of 
team engaged in psychological inquiry, all 
team members agreed to discharge from 
mental hospital, as not dangerous to himself 
or others, patient who six days after dis-
charge shot and killed his mother and 
brother, and decision involved psychological 
rather than medical inquiry, clinical psy-
chologist was competent to testify on prop-
er standards applicable to discharge deci-
sion. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1276 
Trial judge was justified in excluding 
proffered expert's testimony, where in re-
DURFLINGER v. ARTILES 
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taining and presenting expert, defendants 
in wrongful death action violated discovery 
provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure when, upon learning of plaintiffs' deci-
sion not to call that expert, defendants con-
tacted expert and requested copy of report 
he had prepared for plaintiffs. Fed.Rules 
Civ.ProaRules 26, 26(b)(4)(B), 26 note, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
4. Physicians and Surgeons ®=>7 
Where plaintiffs in wrongful death ac-
tion alleged negligence on part of doctors in 
discharging foreseeably violent mental pa-
tient, theory of contributory negligence 
based on volatile family situation and abu-
sive history that patient endured while 
growing up was not valid. 
5. Evidence <&=>512 
Doctor's deposition testimony was 
clearly relevant in wrongful death action 
based upon discharge from state hospital of 
mentally ill patient, where doctor was psy-
chiatrist who found patient to be danger 
to himself and others and recommended 
hospitalization. 
6. Federal Courts <®=>898 
Even if doctor testified as lay witness 
and not as expert, failure to limit his depo-
sition testimony to his conclusions based 
upon his own observations and not those 
based upon second physician was not re-
versible error, where second physician testi-
fied at trial on same issue as first doctor's 
deposition testimony. 
7. Evidence <fc=>359(6) 
Trial court did not commit abuse of 
discretion in finding that videotape of for-
mer mental patient, made during his con-
fession to police on day of murders of his 
mother and brother, was relevant in wrong-
ful death action brought against team of 
doctors who had approved patient's dis-
charge from hospital, where videotape was 
made less than one week after discharge. 
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 401, 28 U.S.C.A. 
8. Evidence $=>359(6) 
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in admitting videotape of former mental 
patient, made during his confession to po-
lice on day of murders of his mother and 
brother, where former mental patient did 
not appear as raving incompetent on video-
tape, videotape suggested patient was very 
much m control of his outward behavior, 
and tape could arguably benefit either of 
parties in wrongful death action brought 
against team of doctors who had found 
patient was not dangerous to himself or 
others and had recommended his release 
from hospital less than one week before 
murders. 
9. Federal Courts <s=>822 
Standard of review for alleged improp-
er conduct of counsel is whether trial court 
abused its discretion. 
10. Federal Courts c=>908 
Where instructions given to jury in 
wrongful death action contained substan-
tially same information as defendants' pro-
posed versions, and instructions correctly 
stated law governing case and were fair to 
all parties, instructions did not constitute 
reversible error. 
Deborah Carney, Turner & Boisseau, 
Wichita, Kan. (Christopher Randall, Turner 
& Boisseau, Wichita, Kan., on briefs), for 
plaintiffs-appellees. 
Reid Stacey, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Kan., 
Topeka, Kan. (Robert T. Stephan, Atty. 
Gen. of Kan., Topeka, Kan., on briefs), for 
defendants-appellants. 
John E. Wilkinson, Topeka, Kan., filed an 
amicus curiae brief on behalf of The Kan. 
Psychiatric Ass'n. 
Before DOYLE, LOGAN and SEY-
MOUR, Circuit Judges. 
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge. 
This is a wrongful death action against 
several doctors employed by Larned State 
Hospital in Larned Kansas. The defend-
ants in this action are Drs. Artiles, Rosales, 
and Medrano. 
A detailed recitation of the facts can be 
found in the Kansas Supreme Court's opin-
ion. See Appendix, infra. We provide a 
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skeletal version of the facts below. On 
January 7, 1974, after contemplating mur-
dering his grandparents, Bradley Durfling-
er was found mentally ill by a probate 
judge and ordered to enter Lamed State 
Hospital On April 19,1974, the defendants 
found that Bradley was not dangerous to 
himself or others and recommended his re-
lease from the hospital. On April 25, 1974, 
Bradley shot and killed his mother and 
brother. 
Inasmuch as the instant action presented 
issues arising out of Kansas law, we sub-
mitted an interrogatory to the Supreme 
Court of Kansas and now have received an 
opinion answering the questions that were 
certified to the Kansas Court. That Court 
held as follows: 
1. A claim arising out of a negligent 
release of a patient who has violent pro-
pensities poses a valid cause of action. 
Physicians have a duty to use reasonable 
and ordinary care and discretion in mak-
ing a recommendation to release such a 
patient This duty is owed to the patient 
and the public. 
2. At least as to causes of action, such as 
this one, arising before enactment of the 
1979 Kansas Tort Claims Act, staff doc-
tors of a state mental institution are not 
immune from civil liability resulting from 
release or failure to warn of the release 
of a dangerous patient. 
We accept these determinations by the 
Kansas Supreme Court. The full opinion 
by that court, 234 Kan. 484, 673 P.2d 86, is 
incorporated herein as an appendix to this 
opinion. 
Several issues remain to be decided by 
this court 
I. DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO 
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS: 
[1] The defendants raise several chal-
lenges to the trial judge's decisions to admit 
and exclude the testimony of certain prof-
fered witnesses. After considering the var-
ious arguments, we conclude that the trial 
judge acted properly in rendering his deci-
sions. Decisions on relevance of testimony 
and competence of witnesses are within the 
broad discretion of the trial judge and will 
only be reversed on a showing of abuse of 
discretion. Mason v. United States, 719 
F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir.1983); Scholz 
Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860 (10th 
Cir.1979). At no time did the trial court 
abuse its discretion. 
A. Testimony of Dr. O'Connor: 
Defendants challenge the competence of 
plaintiffs' expert witness on the ground 
that he was licensed and trained in a differ-
ent discipline than the defendants. The 
expert, Dr. William O'Connor, has several 
advanced degrees in clinical psychology and 
extensive experience in institutional proce-
dure and mental patient evaluation. De-
fendants argue that notwithstanding his 
experience and training, Dr. O'Connor is 
not a medical doctor and is thus incompe-
tent to testify on the standard of care ex-
pected of the defendant medical doctors on 
the team that made the challenged dis-
charge decision. They cite Kansas law 
holding that a medical malpractice defend-
ant must be evaluated according to the 
standards of his or her particular discipline. 
Webb v. Lungstrum, 223 Kan. 487, 575 P.2d 
22 (1978); Hiatt v. Groce, 215 Kan. 14, 523 
P.2d 320 (1974). 
The trial judge considered and rejected 
defendants* contention. He conceded that 
he would "doubt that you could have a foot 
doctor testify as to the qualifications of a 
cardiologist," but held that this case in-
volves psychological evaluation and tech-
nique common to psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists. 
[2] We are in agreement with the trial 
court on this. This is not a case in which 
medical training or competence is at issue. 
The defendant physicians were members of 
a team engaged in psychological inquiry. 
Indeed, one of the original defendants, who 
settled before trial, was a clinical psycholo-
gist. All the team members agreed to dis-
charge Bradley Durflinger, and all con-
sidered the same historical and diagnostic 
information. The decision involved psycho-
logical rather than medical inquiry, and a 
clinical psychologist such as Dr. O'Connor 
has competence to testify on 
standards applicable to such a decision. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in admitting Dr. O'Connor's testimony. 
B. Testimony of Dr. Dyck: 
[3] The defendants also challenge the 
trial judge's exclusion of one of their prof-
fered experts, a psychiatrist named Dr. 
Dyck. The trial judge was justified in ex-
cluding Dr. Dyck's testimony. In retaining 
and presenting Dr. Dyck, the defendants 
violated the discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial 
court was within its discretion in excluding 
the testimony of the witness on these 
grounds. 
Plaintiffs had originally retained Dr. 
Dyck as a consultant, and designated him as 
a probable witness in presenting their case. 
Subsequently, they decided not to use him 
as a witness, and so informed defendants. 
Plaintiffs did not give defendants any in-
formation about the substance of Dr. 
Dyck's evaluation because they had decided 
not to call him to the witness stand. Upon 
learning of plaintiffs' decision not to call 
Dr. Dyck, defendants contacted Dr. Dyck 
and requested a copy of the report he pre-
pared for the plaintiffs. He sent them a 
copy of the evaluation and the defendants 
sought at trial to call him as their witness. 
In proceeding in this rather unorthodox 
fashion, defendants violated Rule 26 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
26(bX4)(B) provides that: 
A party may discover facts known or 
opinions held by an expert who has been 
retained or specially employed by another 
party in anticipation of litigation or prep-
aration for trial and who is not expected 
to be called as a witness at trial, only 
upon a showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances under which it is impractica-
ble for the party seeking discovery to 
obtain facts or opinions on the same sub-
ject by other means. 
The rule is designed to promote fairness by 
precluding unreasonable access to an oppos-
ing party's diligent trial preparation. See 
Advisory Committee Notes, Fed.R.Civ.P. 
DURFLINGER v. ARTILES 891 
Cite as 727 F.2d 888 (1984) 
the proper 26(b)(4)(B); Ager v. Jane C. Stormont 
Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 
F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir.1980). Under the 
standards articulated in Ager, supra at 501, 
Dr. Dyck was certainly an "expert who has 
been retained or specially employed by an-
other party in anticipation of litigation." 
He prepared a report for plaintiffs after the 
case was filed. This was based on informa-
tion furnished to him by plaintiffs. He was 
paid by plaintiffs for his services. In ob-
taining his report and assistance, defend-
ants failed to make the necessary showing 
of special need to the court Had they 
made a showing, there is small possibility 
that they could have prevailed; they had an 
expert testify on the same psychological 
principles and procedures, and could proba-
bly have obtained others with little difficul-
ty. 
In proceeding as they did, defendants cir-
cumvented the discovery process and sub-
verted the principle of fairness that under-
lies Rule 26(b)(4XB). Defendants' disre-
gard of the Rule, coupled with the prejudice 
Dr. Dyck's specially informed opinion might 
work on plaintiffs' case, justified the trial 
court's exclusion of the proffered evidence. 
The exclusion worked no hardship on de-
fendants because they presented another 
expert on the same subject. So, our hold-
ing is that the trial judge acted within his 
discretion. In different circumstances we 
recognize that a trial judge might not be 
required to exclude the testimony of a wit-
ness consulted in violation of the rules of 
discovery. 
C. Testimony of Bradley Durflinger and 
Reverend Holgate: 
Defendants argue that the trial judge 
erred in excluding the testimony of Bradley 
Durflinger and Reverend Holgate. Specif-
ically, they argue that those two witnesses 
would have testified to the volatile family 
situation and abusive history that Bradley 
endured while growing up. Defendants ar-
gue that this testimony is relevant to their 
defense of plaintiffs' contributory negli-
gence in the deaths of Margaret and Cor-
win Durflinger. 
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[4] The trial judge ruled that the de-
fendants' theory of contributory negligence 
was invalid, and excluded the testimony as 
irrelevant. We agree. The plaintiffs in 
this case allege negligence in discharging a 
foreseeably violent mental patient. De-
fendants might be permitted to argue con-
tributory negligence if the plaintiffs had 
contributed to the decision to discharge 
Bradley or if they had provoked Bradley to 
act violently. At the trial, however, de-
fendants did not proceed on either of these 
grounds. Defendants sought to prove that 
plaintiffs' past abuse or neglect led or con-
tributed to the deaths. This does not estab-
lish contributory negligence. Contributory 
negligence is not established unless there 
exists proof of past mistreatment of Brad-
ley which proximately caused or contribut-
ed to his violence. 
Negligence is the proximate cause of an 
injury when it appears that "the injury 
was the natural and probable conse-
quence of the negligence or wrongful act, 
and that it ought to have been foreseen 
in the light of the attending circumstanc-
es. 
fleece Const Co., Inc. v. State Highway 
Comm'n., 6 Kan.App.2d 188, 627 P.2d 361, 
364 (1981) (quoting Schwarzschild & Sul-
zberger Co. v. Weeks, 72 Kan. 190, 83 P. 406 
(1905)). Even if plaintiffs had mistreated 
or neglected Bradley in the past, defend-
ants offered no evidence that the deaths of 
Margaret and Corwin Durflinger could rea-
sonably be called a "natural and probable 
consequence" of the plaintiffs' past treat-
ment of Bradley. Because they could not 
demonstrate that Bradley's alleged child-
hood suffering proximately caused or con-
tributed to Bradley's violent outburst, the 
trial judge properly rejected their proffered 
theory of contributory negligence. 
D. Deposition of Dr. Moore: 
In addition to their challenge to the trial 
courTs rulings on witnesses, the defendants 
argue that the trial court improperly admit-
ted the deposition of Dr. Federick Moore. 
Dr. Moore is the psychiatrist who, following 
the incident with Bradley's grandparents, 
found Bradley Durflinger to be a danger to 
himself and others arid recommended hospi-
talization. The defendants contend that his 
deposition testimony was irrelevant and 
based on facts not within his personal 
knowledge. Neither of these arguments 
commands a reversal here. 
[5] Dr. Moore's deposition testimony 
was clearly relevant. He was the director 
of the Mental Health Institute charged by 
the Probate Court with evaluating Bradley 
Durflinger. His observations and conclu-
sions are germane to the issue of Bradley's 
mental condition on admission to the hospi-
tal and his need for therapy. The defend-
ants' relevancy objection is unfounded. 
The defendants also challenge the deposi-
tion on the ground that it contains testimo-
ny based on facts not within Dr. Moore's 
personal knowledge. The record is not 
clear whether Dr. Moore was an expert 
witness or merely a lay witness to certain 
facts at issue in the case. The standards 
applied to lay and expert witnesses differ. 
Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provides: "A Pay] witness may not testify 
to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that he has 
personal knowledge of the matter." Rule 
703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence per-
mits an expert to base an opinion on any 
facts or data, admissible or not, which are 
"of a type reasonably relied on by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions 
or inferences on the subject." In re Air-
crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301,1309 
(9th Cir.1982) (quoting Rule 703). In draft-
ing this rule, the Advisory Committee noted 
that "the rule is designed to broaden the 
basis for expert opinions beyond that cur-
rent in many jurisdictions and to bring the 
judicial practice into line with the practice 
of the experts themselves when not in 
court." Advisory Committee Notes, Fe&R 
Evid. 703. 
[6] In their brief, defendants suggest 
that Dr. Moore is to be treated as an expert 
If this is so, then his conclusions based in 
part on data and reports prepared by Dr. 
Strange, a psychologist colleague, in reach-
ing a conclusion on Bradley's condition and 
DURFLINGER v. ARTILES 
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prognosis was properly in evidence. He 
could and did reasonably rely on this infor-
mation in forming his professional opinion. 
Aircrash, 684 F.2d at 1314 (9th Cir.1982) 
(expert permitted to testify on pilot compe-
tence based on flight training records). 
If Dr. Moore served as a lay witness, the 
deposition testimony should have been lim-
ited to his conclusions based on his own 
observations. The conclusions based upon 
Dr. Strange's observations should have been 
excluded. This possible error in the trial 
judge's ruling, however, does not require 
reversal of this case. "Even if there is 
error, reversal is appropriate only if we can 
say that the error affected the substantial 
rights of the parties." Aircrash, supra at 
1313; Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. No substantial 
rights were affected by this alleged error. 
Dr. Strange testified at trial on the same 
issue as Dr. Moore's deposition testimony. 
Moreover, the Probate Court records were 
already in evidence. The evidence chal-
lenged here was cumulative at worst, and 
did not substantially damage defendants' 
case. 
E. Videotape of Bradley Durflinger: 
Defendants assert that the trial court er-
roneously admitted a videotape of Bradley 
Durflinger, which was made during his con-
fession to the police on the day of the 
murders. Defendants maintain that this 
evidence of Bradley Durflinger's behavior 
subsequent to his discharge from Larned 
State Hospital is irrelevant and highly prej-
udicial. 
[7] The trial court received the video-
tape on the grounds that it was relevant to 
Bradley Durflinger's state of mind and de-
meanor and to the similarity of conduct 
between the contemplated murder of his 
grandparents and the actual murder of his 
mother and brother. The trial judge cau-
tioned the jury that the tape was received 
and could be considered for limited pur-
poses. The videotaped confession at issue 
meets the test of relevancy set forth in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Relevant 
evidence within the meaning of Rule 401 is 
evidence "having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." The videotape of 
Bradley Durflinger, made less than a week 
after his discharge from Larned State Hos-
pital meets this broad definition of relevan-
cy. While this court may question the 
weight to be given to evidence of Bradley's 
activities subsequent to his discharge, it 
cannot be said that the trial court commit-
ted an abuse of discretion in finding that 
the evidence was relevant. 
The contention of defendant that admit-
ting this relevant evidence prejudiced the 
jury is a harder one. Other courts have 
grappled with the question of whether the 
admission of a videotape into evidence vio-
lated Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 
403 provides: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury . . . . " 
In deciding whether evidence is admissible 
under Rule 403, a trial judge must weigh 
the probative value of the challenged evi-
dence against the probability of prejudice. 
Thomas v. C.G. Tate Const Co., Inc., 465 
F.Supp. 566 (D.S.C.1979). Thus the decision 
is based on the exercise of discretion. 
In Thomas, supra, the court excluded a 
proffered videotape. The videotape por-
trayed, in graphic detail, the pain and suf-
fering experienced by the plaintiff as he 
underwent therapy for burns he received as 
a result of an automobile accident. The 
court noted that the tape would nauseate a 
squeamish individual. As part of its ruling, 
the court recognized the probable inflam-
matory effect the film would have on a 
jury, as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
could instead present the same evidence 
through the testimony of the plaintiff, his 
wife, doctor and therapist. In addition, the 
court recognized that the videotape format, 
without regard to its content, would stand 
out in the minds of jurors. 
In Grimes v. Employers Mut Liab. Ins. 
Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D.Alaska, 1977), the 
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court allowed a portion of a videotape to be 
shown. The film depicted the plaintiff (the 
victim of an industrial accident) performing 
daily activities. The court ruled that the 
films "illustrate, better than words, the im-
pact the injury has had on the plaintiffs 
life in terms of pain and suffering and loss 
of enjoyment of life. While the scenes are 
unpleasant, so is plaintiff's injury. Id. at 
610. As noted by the Thomas court, liabili-
ty was not at issue in Grimes and the film 
was shown only as an aid in determining 
damages. 
The case of Foster v. Crawford Shipping 
Co., Ltd., 496 F.2d 788 (3rd Cir.1974), is one 
in which plaintiff suffered personal injuries 
while unloading defendant's ship. The trial 
court found the defendant liable and the 
only issue on appeal was the amount of 
damages. After the injury, the plaintiff 
became a severe schizophrenic and was ad-
judicated an incompetent. At issue was 
plaintiff's prognosis for recovery. The trial 
court admitted a videotape of a conversa-
tion between the plaintiff and his attorney. 
The court of appeals held that the trial 
court committed reversible error in admit-
ting the tape. Plaintiff contended that the 
purpose of the film was merely to illustrate 
their expert witnesses's testimony regard-
ing plaintiffs condition. The court found 
that even if the film had actually been 
utilized in this way, "any benefit which 
might have been derived in the factfinding 
process by such an illustration was far out-
weighed by the prejudice of what amounted 
to ex parte testimony from the absent in-
competent." Id. at 792. 
The above cases suggest that the prejudi-
cial effect of a videotape is decided on a 
case by case basis. These cases illustrate 
the approaches taken by various courts in 
deciding the admissibility of a videotape. 
These cases which deal with different vi-
deotapes and were decided under totally 
different circumstances do not, however, 
provide an answer for this case. The par-
ticular circumstances determine admission 
or exclusion. As noted above, decisions on 
relevancy of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. Mason, supra. 
This same rule applies to questions of preju-
dice. Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 
1069 (10th Cir.1983). After having re-
viewed the record we are unable to hold 
that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
admitting the videotape. 
[8] Bradley Durflinger did not appear 
as a raving incompetent on the videotape. 
The videotape suggested that Bradley was 
very much in control of his outward behav-
ior. Indeed, the trial judge commented at 
trial: "He appears much more normal on 
the tube than you would imagine a guy of 
that character. I thought maybe the de-
fendants wanted it for evidentiary pur-
poses." The tape could arguably benefit 
either of the parties. It cannot be said to 
be unduly prejudicial and the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting it. 
E. Remarks of Plaintiffs Attorney: 
[9] The defendants also argue that the 
trial court erred in permitting plaintiffs' 
counsel to make certain remarks. Accord-
ing to defendants, counsel's references to 
famous killers and questions to witnesses 
regarding psychotic behavior were improp-
er. Defendants urge this court to find that 
these remarks were irrelevant and prejudi-
cial. This argument, however, is unpersua-
sive. The standard of review for alleged 
improper conduct of counsel is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. Arnold v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186 (4th 
Cir.1982), cert, denied, U.S. , 103 
S.Ct. 1801, 76 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983); Slade v. 
Slade, 439 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.1971); Zeigler 
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 437 F.2d 
80 (5th Cir.1971); Waters v. Western Com-
pany of N. Am., 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 
1971). Moreover, "trial court discretion as 
to these matters is broad or—what comes to 
the same thing—appellate review is espe-
cially deferential." Arnold v. Eastern Air 
Lines, supra at 195. In cases containing 
remarks comparable to those made here, 
appellate courts have found that remarks of 
counsel were not prejudicial. See, e.g., 
Zeigler, supra at 81-82 (reference to grade 
crossing as a "death trap" during opening 
argument in tort action). Indeed, courts 
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have upheld as non-prejudicial comments by 
counsel that were much stronger than those 
made here. Arnold, supra at 196. ("[East-
ern must have searched the countryside" 
for [opponent's expert witness] and "for 40 
bucks an hour, you can probably get almost 
anybody to say anything"; "killing people 
and maiming people is something they've 
gotten immune to as a part of doing busi-
ness."). 
After considering the remarks at issue 
here, there is no reason to believe that the 
challenged comments were either prejudi-
cial or that the trial court's response to 
them was an abuse of discretion. In reach-
ing this decision it is important to note that 
this was a long trial. It is unlikely that 
these isolated remarks prejudiced the jury 
in any way. 
II. DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
[10] Defendants contend that the trial 
court erred in its instructions to the jury. 
Essentially, defendants' argument is that 
the trial judge should have used the instruc-
tions proposed by appellant. The instruc-
tions given to the jury contained substan-
tially the same information as appellants' 
proposed versions. While this court may 
note that litigants always seek the instruc-
tion that is most favorable to their position, 
this is not the standard by which to judge 
the charge to the jury. "The appellate 
standard of review to be applied by the 
court is clear: an error in jury instructions 
will mandate reversal of a judgment only if 
the error is determined to have been preju-
dicial, based on a review of the record as a 
whole." Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 
932, 938 (4th Cir.1983) (citing Connors v. 
McNulty, 697 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.1983)). In 
addition, the reviewing court is to "consider 
all that the jury heard and, from standpoint 
of the jury, decide 'not whether the charge 
was faultless in every particular but wheth-
er the jury was misled in any way and 
whether it had understanding of the issues 
and its duty to determine these issues.'" 
Alloy Ml Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 
635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.1980) (quoting Borel 
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 
1076, 1100 (5th Cir.1973), cert denied, 419 
U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 
(1974)). The district court's instructions to 
the jury correctly stated the law governing 
the case and were fair to all parties. The 
instructions do not constitute reversible er-
ror. 
III. MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VER-
DICT & NEW TRIAL: 
The various points raised by the defend-
ants have been treated in some detail and it 
has been this court's conclusion that none of 
the issues presented disclosed substantial 
error. Consequently, although we have 
noted and considered the arguments in the 
briefs with respect to these matters, inas-
much as the arguments involve a summary 
of the questions already considered, we con-
clude that it is unnecessary to discuss them 
in detail again. 
The decision of the trial court, 563 
F.Supp. 322, should be affirmed. 
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The issue in this medical malpractice and 
wrongful death action is whether the de-
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fendant's counsel, as an aid to discovery, 
has the right to attempt to interview dece-
dent's physicians ex parte with respect to 
matters relating to the litigation. 
I 
The facts material to our resolution of 
this question are not disputed. In June, 
1983, Larry Stempler, individually and as 
general administrator and administrator ad 
prosequendum of the Estate of Barbara 
Anne Stempler, deceased, brought this ac-
tion against Dr. E. Allan Speidell and a 
number of fictitious defendants. An 
amended complaint identified two nurses as 
individual defendants. 
Decedent consulted Dr. Speidell in Au-
gust, 1981, complaining of pain, abdominal 
distension and constipation. Dr. Speidell 
diagnosed a fecal impaction and referred 
decedent to the emergency room of St. 
Barnabas Medical Center. Decedent was 
admitted to the hospital and treatment was 
initiated. Dr. Speidell was designated the 
attending physician. During the early 
morning hours of the day following her 
admission, Mrs. Stempler experienced diffi-
culty breathing and failed to respond to 
stimuli. She was treated emergently for 
cardiac arrest. Dr. Speidell was notified 
and Mrs. Stempler was pronounced dead 
shortly after his arrival at the hospital that 
morning. 
In preparing to defend the claims assert-
ed against Dr. Speidell, his counsel ascer-
tained that decedent had received medical 
care from a significant number of physi-
cians and health care providers. Dr. Spei-
dell's counsel requested that the plaintiff 
sign authorizations in order to induce such 
physicians and health care providers to re-
lease information concerning decedent to 
defendant's counsel. The plaintiff signed 
each of the authorizations, but only after 
plaintiffs counsel crossed out the portion 
of the text reading: "[T]his will further 
authorize you to discuss any and all infor-
mation concerning any treatment by you or 
examinations performed by you concerning 
the undersigned.'' In its place, plaintiffs 
counsel inserted the following statement on 
each authorization form: "This does not 
authorize you to have any discussions con-
cerning these records, my care or my claim, 
but is expressly limited to allowing you to 
provide copies or inspection of my records 
and x-rays." 
On the assumption that the substituted 
language on the authorization forms would 
preclude direct interviews with the physi-
cians who had treated decedent, defendant 
filed a motion with the Law Division to 
compel the plaintiff to execute unrestricted 
authorization forms. In support of the mo-
tion, defendant's counsel submitted an affi-
davit alleging that Dr. Clara J. Szekely, a 
psychiatrist who had treated decedent, ad-
vised the defendant's counsel that the re-
striction inserted in the authorization 
would prevent her from communicating 
with defendant's counsel concerning dece-
dent. Specifically, the affidavit alleged 
that Dr. Szekely believed her records would 
be unintelligible without her interpretation, 
and she would not provide copies of them. 
According to defendant's counsel, Dr. 
Szekely was willing to furnish a written 
interpretation detailing her records, but 
only if plaintiff authorized her to do so. 
Plaintiff resisted the motion to compel 
unrestricted authorizations since they 
would permit defendant's counsel to inter-
view personally decedent's treating physi-
cians, a procedure that allegedly is not 
authorized by our Court Rules. Although 
plaintiff authorized treating physicians to 
provide access to decedent's medical 
records, plaintiff contends that depositions 
are the only appropriate means by which 
the physicians may furnish additional rele-
vant, unprivileged information to defend-
ant's counsel without creating an undue 
risk of disclosing confidential information 
not related to the litigation. 
The Law Division judge granted the de-
fendant's motion to compel plaintiff to fur-
nish unrestricted authorizations. After the 
Appellate Division denied leave to appeal, 
this Court granted plaintiffs motion for 
leave to appeal. R. 2:2-2(b). 
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Although the right claimed by defend-
ant's counsel to conduct personal inter-
views with decedent's physicians is cast in 
a nontestimonial discovery context, plain-
tiffs objections to the interviews have their 
roots in the testimonial patient-physician 
privilege. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.7. > 
Plaintiff concedes that instituting suit ex-
tinguishes the privilege to the extent that 
decedent's medical condition will be a 
factor in the litigation. NJ.S.A. 2A:84A-
22.4.2 However, as to those elements of 
decedent's prior medical history that are 
not relevant to the litigation, plaintiff as-
serts the continued viability of the privi-
lege, contending that unsupervised ex 
parte interviews with decedent's treating 
physicians do not afford as complete pro-
tection against disclosure of privileged ma-
terial as would be provided by. depositions 
upon oral examination. See R. 4:14. 
Because such interviews would take 
place in a nontestimonial context, no stat-
ute or Court Rute express}}7 precludes de-
tense counsel from interviewing decedent's 
treating physicians regarding confidential 
communications. Moreover, even if the 
testimonial privilege could be imputed to 
such interviews, no statute or rule express-
ly precludes ex parte interviews concerning 
unprivileged communications, and the initi-
ation of suit abrogates the privilege as to 
medical conditions pertinent to the litiga-
tion. However, as was the case with dece-
1. NJ.S.A. 2A.-84A-22.2 provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a 
person, whether or not a party, has a privilege 
in a civil action or in a prosecution for a 
crime or violation of the disorderly persons 
law or for an act of juvenile delinquency to 
refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness 
from disclosing, a communication, if he 
claims the privilege and the judge finds that 
(a) the communication was a confidential 
communication between patient and physi-
cian, and (b) the patient or the physician 
reasonably believed the communication to be 
necessary or helpful to enable the physician 
to make a diagnosis of the condition of the 
patient or to prescribe or render treatment 
therefor, and (c) the witness (i) is the holder 
of the privilege or (ii) at the time of the 
communication was the physician or a person 
to whom disclosure was made because rea-
sonably necessary for the transmission of the 
dent's psychiatrist, treating physicians are 
not likely to cooperate with defense counsel 
in the absence of authorization from the 
patient. Accordingly, defense counsel in 
this case sought to compel plaintiff to fur-
nish written authorization for interviews 
with decedent's treating physicians. The 
issue before us is whether plaintiff should 
be compelled to authorize such ex parte 
communication between defense counsel 
and decedent's physicians, as an aid to de-
fendant's discovery, and if so, under what 
protective conditions. A resolution of this 
issue requires us to weigh the interests 
protected by the patient-physician privilege 
and the physician's professional obligation 
of confidentiality against the interests ad-
vanced by permitting defense counsel to 
conduct ex parte interviews with dece-
dent's physicians regarding those condi-
tions pertinent to the claims asserted in the 
litigation. 
II 
The patient-physician privilege was not 
recognized at common law in New Jersey, 
Hague v. Williams, 37 NJ. 328, 334-35, 
181 A 2d 345 (1962), nor was it recognized 
under the common law in other jurisdic-
tions. State v. Dyal, 97 NJ 229, 235, 478 
A 2d 390 (1984); McCormick's Handbook 
of the Law of Evidence, § 98 (2d ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter McCormick ]; 8 J. Wigmore, 
communication or for the accomplishment of 
the purpose for which it was transmitted or 
(iii) is any other person who obtained knowl-
edge or possession of the communication as 
the result of an intentional breach of the 
physician's duty of nondisclosure* by the phy-
sician or his agent or servant and (d) the 
claimant is the holder of the privilege or a 
person authorized to claim the privilege for 
him. 
2. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.4 provides: 
There is no privilege under this act in an 
action in which the condition of the patient is 
an element or factor of the claim or defense 
of the patient or of any partv claiming 
through or under the patient or claiming as a 
beneficiary of the patient through a contract 
to which the patient is or was a party or 
under which the patient is or was insured. 
860 N.J. 495 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Evidence, § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
Moreover, the original New Jersey Su-
preme Court Committee on the Revision of 
the Law of Evidence expressly rejected the 
adoption of the patient-physician privilege, 
State v. Dyal, supra, 97 NJ. at 235-36, 
478 A 2d 390, citing Report of the Commit-
tee on the Revision of the Law of Evi-' 
deuce to the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, R. 27, drafter's comment, at 71-72, and 
it has never been adopted as a Rule of 
Evidence by this Court. State v. Dyal, 
supra, 97 NJ. at 235-36, 478 A 2d 390; 
State v. Soney, 177 NJSuper. 47, 57, 424 
A 2d 1182 (App.Div.1980), certif. den., 87 
NJ. 313, 434 A 2d 67 (1981). Thus, in New 
Jersey the privilege is of relatively recent 
statutory origin. L.1968, c. 185 (codified at 
NJ.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.7). 
The testimonial privilege is justified be-
cause it encourages candid communication 
between patient and doctor without fear of 
unauthorized disclosures. McCormick, su-
pra, § 98 at 213; see J. Wigmore, supra, 
§ 2380a, at 828-29. 
It has been said that the purpose of 
the patient-physician .privilege is to en-
able the patient to secure medical servic-
es without fear of betrayal and the un-
warranted embarrassing and detrimental 
disclosure in court of information which 
might deter the patient from revealing 
his symptoms to the doctor to the detri-
ment of his health. See Branch v. Wil-
kinson, 198 Neb. 649, 256 NW.2d 307, 
312 (Sup.Ct.1977); State v. Staat, 291 
Minn. 394, 192 N. W.2d 192, 195 (Sup.Ct. 
1971). [State in Interest of M.P.C., 165 
NJSuper. 131, 136, 397 A 2d 1092 (App. 
Div.1979).] 
Critics of the privilege maintain that the 
vast majority of communications between 
patient and physician are not intended to be 
strictly confidential, and as to those that 
are, they argue that the absence of privi-
lege would not deter patients from frank 
communication with their physicians be-
cause them primary concern is to secure 
proper medical attention. J. Wigmore, su-
pra, § 2380a, at 829-30; McCormick, su-
pra, § 105, at 225. 
This Court previously has articulated the 
major factors that argue against a broad 
application of the patient-physician privi-
lege: 
The inevitable effect of allowing the 
privilege * * * is the withholding of evi-
dence, often of the most reliable and 
probative kind, from the trier of fact. To 
the extent that the privilege is honored, 
it may therefore undermine the search 
for truth in the administration of justice. 
McCormick, supra, § 105, a+ 226; 8 
Wigmore, supra, § 2380a, at 830. Be-
cause the privilege precludes the admis-
sion of relevant evidence, it is restrictive-
ly construed. State v. Soney, supra, 111 
NJSuper. at 58[424 A2d 1182]; State 
in the Interest ofM.RC, 165 NJ.Super. 
131, 136 [397 A2d 1092] (App.Div.1979). 
Indeed, distinguished scholars have as-
serted that the privilege cannot be justi-
fied. See, e.g., Chaffee, "Is Justice 
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doc-
tor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?," 52 
Yale LJ. 607 (1943); 8 Wigmore, supra, 
§ 2380a, at 832. [State v. Dyal, supra, 
97 NJ. at 237-38, 478 A 2d 390.] 
[1] Notwithstanding the concern that 
application of the patient-physician privi-
lege may bar the admissibility of probative 
testimony, there is a clear recognition that, 
in general, a physician does have a profes-
sional obligation to maintain the confiden-
tiality of his patient's communications. 
See American Medical Assfn, Principles 
of Medical Ethics, § 9 (1957). This obli-
gation to preserve confidentiality is recog-
nized as part of the Hippocratic Oath. As 
this Court observed in Hague v. Williams, 
supra: 
The benefits which inure to the relation-
ship of physician-patient from the denial 
to a physician of any right to promiscu-
ously disclose such information are self-
evident. On the other hand, it is impossi-
ble to conceive of any countervailing ben-
efits which would arise by according a 
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patient's health. 
A patient should be entitled to freely 
disclose his symptoms and condition to 
his doctor in order to receive proper 
treatment without fear that those facts 
may become public property. Only thus 
can the purpose of the relationship be 
fulfilled. [37 NJ. at 335-36, 181 A 2d 
345.] 
Accordingly, courts in other jurisdictions 
have held that the unauthorized extra-judi-
cial disclosure by a physician of confiden-
tial information from a patient may be ac-
tionable. Hammonds v. Aetna Cos. & 
Surety Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, den'g recon-
sideration of 237 F.Supp. 96, 101-102 (N.D. 
Ohio 1965); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 
287 5o.2d 824 (1973); Wenninger v. Mues-
ing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 iV.JF.2d 333 (1976) 
(dictum); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 
224, 177 N W. 831 (1920); Clark v. Geraci, 
29 Misc.2d 791, 208 Af.KS.2d 564 (Sup.Ct. 
1960); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc.2d 441, 
273 NY.S.2d 288 (Sup.Ct. 1966); Berry v. 
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 
(1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 
162 P. 572 (1917) (dictum); see Note, "Le-
gal Protection of the Confidential Nature 
of the Physician Patient Relationship/' 52 
Colum.L.Rev. 383, 397-98 (1952) (question-
ing the utility of recognizing an action for 
physician's wrongful disclosure other than 
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding); 
Note, "Medical Practice and the Right to 
Privacy," 43 Minn.L.Rev. 943 (1959); Note, 
"Roe v. Doe: A Remedy for Disclosure of 
Psychiatric Confidences," 29 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 190, 192-93 (1975). Contra 
Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 
S.W.2d 249 (1965); cf. Collins v. Howard, 
156 F.Supp. 322 (S.D.Ga.1957) (complaint 
alleging wrongful disclosure of test results 
dismissed; no confidential relationship be-
tween physician and patient recognized in 
Georgia; however, even if there were, 
•mere taking of blood sample does not es-
tablish patient-physician relationship). 
In Hague v. Williams, supra, 37 N.J. 
328, 181 A2d 345, a case decided prior to 
the enactment of the testimonial privilege, 
daughter died ei^ht 
months after birth because of a congenital 
heart defect. When plaintiffs filed a claim 
under a life insurance contract naming ih(> 
infant as insured and the father as benefj 
ciary, the life insurance company inter 
viewed defendant pediatrician who advi*«M| 
the insurer that the infant had had heart 
trouble since birth. Plaintiffs sought dam 
ages for the allegedly unlawful disclosure 
of this information by defendant, contend-
ing that he had never advised them of the 
congenital heart defect and that defendant 
had no right to disclose such information to 
the insurer without express authorization. 
Id. at 329-32, 181 A2d 345. 
Although this Court recognized that such 
a cause of action might be sustained in a 
proper case, it affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of the counts of the complaint 
that sought damages for the unauthorized 
disclosure, concluding that the patient's 
right of confidentiality was not absolute 
but qualified: 
This is not to say that the patient 
enjoys an absolute right, but rather that 
he possesses a limited right against such 
disclosure, subject to exceptions prompt-
ed by the supervening interest of society. 
We conclude, therefore, that ordinarily a 
physician receives information relating to 
a patient's health in a confidential capaci-
ty and should not disclose such informa-
tion without the patient's consent, except 
where the public interest or the private 
interest of the patient so demands. 
Without delineating the precise outer 
contours of the exceptions, it may gen,.r 
ally be said that disclosure may, under 
such compelling circumstances, be made 
to a person with a legitimate interest ,n 
the patient's health. [Id. at 33C, lxi A j<| 
345.] 
This judicial recognition that a phyHnan 
could be held liable for a breach ol the 
obligation of confidentiality adds weight | n 
the argument that unsupervised interviews 
by defense counsel may not adequately 
protect the physician's interest in avoiding 
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inadvertent disclosures that could be ac-
tionable. Thus, it is asserted that the phy-
sician's interest can be guarded only by 
requiring defendant's counsel to use depo-
sitions rather than informal interviews to 
obtain unprivileged information from plain-
tiffs physicians. 
Defendant, however, argues that requir-
ing the formality of depositions would im-
pose unnecessarily cumbersome restric-
tions on his right to prepare for trial. He 
contends that an informal interview is the 
most appropriate way to ascertain whether 
any of plaintiff's physicians possess unpriv-
ileged information relevant to the defense 
of the litigation, arguing that in this con-
text depositions are impractical, inefficient, 
and costly. Defendant maintains that it is 
unfair to restrict his counsel's access to 
potential witnesses when no comparable re-
striction is imposed upon plaintiff. 
Ill 
Courts in our own state and throughout 
the country are sharply divided on the 
question. A number of courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that defendant's 
counsel should not be allowed to interview 
plaintiffs treating physicians ex parte but 
should be restricted to depositions. Weav-
er v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D.1981) 
(personal interviews not contemplated by 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R. 
Civ.P.) and could lead to discouraging plain-
tiff's physicians from testifying); Garner v. 
Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22 (D.Alaska 
1973) (no specific authorization of interviews 
contained in Fed.R.Civ.P.); Wenninger v. 
Muesing, supra, 307 Minn. 405, 240 
N. W.2d 333 (depositions guard against un-
authorized disclosure of information that is 
privileged or irrelevant and presence of 
patient's attorney protects physician from 
unwitting disclosure of confidential infor-
mation); Jaap v. District Ct. 8th J. Dist, 
623 P.2d 1389 (Mont.1981) (Montana Rules 
do not authorize personal interviews); 
Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.2d 148, 413 
iV.KS.2d 582 (Sup.Ct.), affd mem., 73 
A.D.2d 589, 422 \.Y.S.2d 887 (App.Div. 
1979) (New York Rules do not authorize 
interviews; difficult for physician to deter-
mine the extent to which patient's privilege 
has been waived because issue of legal 
relevancy is complex; therefore, rule re-
quiring formal discovery will lessen num-
ber of suits against doctors for wrongful 
disclosure); Cwiek v. Rochester, 54 A.D. 2d 
1078, 388 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup.Ct.1976); cf. 
Alexander v. Knight. 197 Pa.Super. 79, 
177 A2d 142 (Super.Ct.1962) (doctor owes 
patient a duty to refuse affirmative assist-
ance to patient's adversary in litigation). 
Those courts in other jurisdictions that 
have upheld the right of defendant's coun-
sel to conduct informal interviews of plain-
tiffs treating physicians have done so be-
cause court rules do not prohibit such inter-
views and those interviews constitute a 
more efficient and less expensive method 
of trial preparation. Doe v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.1983); Trans-
World Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 
1148 (Alaska 1976); see also Gailitis v. 
Bassett, 5 Mich.App. 382, 146 N.W.2d 708 
(Ct.App.1966) (no reason given for allowing 
interview of plaintiff's physician); Arctic 
Motor Freight Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d 
1006 (Alaska 1977) (citing Trans-World In-
vestments v. Drobny, supra). 
Several of our unreported lower court 
decisions adhere to the rule that restricts 
defendant's counsel to deposition of plain-
tiffs physicians. Another unreported low-
er court decision, however, permits ex 
parte interviews of plaintiffs physicians, 
and compels the plaintiff's execution of un-
restricted authorizations. 
A recent opinion by our Appellate Divi-
sion upheld defendant's right to interview 
ex parte plaintiff's treating physicians. In 
Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J.Super. 444, 
480 A2d 223 (App.Div.1984), defendants in 
a medical malpractice action appealed from 
an order of the trial court barring two of 
plaintiffs treating physicians, one of whom 
had been interviewed by defendant's coun-
sel, from testifying on defendants' behalf 
as either fact or expert witnesses. The 
plaintiff had been treated for an upper 
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respiratory infection by defendants, Man-
rodt and Brown, who prescribed a penicillin 
derivative known as amoxicillin. Subse-
quently she came under the care of Drs. 
Galton and Needle. Plaintiff developed 
vasculitis, a severe systemic disease result-
ing in permanently debilitating injuries, 
which she contended was a reaction to im-
properly prescribed amoxicillin. Id. at 447-
48, 480 A 2d 223. 
Defendants moved to compel plaintiff to 
furnish authorizations for interviews with 
Drs. Galton, Needle, and other treating 
physicians, but the trial court denied the 
motion without a clear explanation for its 
ruling. It did not, however, foreclose the 
possibility of granting the motion at a fu-
ture time. The doctors had not been asked 
to speak to defense counsel but apparently 
were willing to do so. Defense counsel 
arranged a meeting with Dr. Galton and 
advised plaintiffs counsel by letter that he 
should move for a protective order if he 
objected to the meeting. Plaintiff did not 
move for a protective order but reserved 
the right to object at trial to the admission 
of any evidence generated by the interview 
with Dr. Galton. The meeting with Dr. 
Galton took place and both Dr. Galton and 
Dr. Needle later furnished written reports 
expressing doubt that amoxicillin was the 
cause of plaintiffs condition. The trial 
court excluded their testimony. Id. at 448-
50, 480 A2d 223. 
In reversing, Judge Botter noted that 
neither the Court Rules nor the Rules of 
Evidence prohibit informal interviews by 
defense counsel for the purpose of obtain-
ing unprivileged information from a poten-
tial witness. The Appellate Division ob-
served that it would be unfair to bar the 
testimony of Drs. Galton and Needle since 
defendant had attempted to obtain a ruling 
on the issue and plaintiff had failed to 
move for a protective order. Id. at 450, 
480 A 2d 223. In recognizing the right of 
defense counsel to conduct personal inter-
views with plaintiffs treating physicians, 
the court reasoned: 
The policy of law is to allow all compe-
tent, relevant evidence to be produced, 
subject only to a limited number of privi-
leges. Sir Emd.R. 7. As stated in Ha-
gue v. Wilhants, 37 N.J. at 335 [181 A2d 
345], "society has a right to testimony 
and . . . all privileges of exemption from 
this duty are exceptional." We do a dis-
service to these principles by creating 
restrictions <)n the right of parties to talk 
to potential witnesses. The weighing of 
policy has been done by the Legislature 
in the definition of privileges and the 
terms on which they are lost or surren-
dered. To speculate about sinister mo-
tives of attorneys and treating doctors 
and to establish additional limitations on 
the right to seek out evidence as a mat-
ter of policy would do mischief to the 
adversary Hystem. It would be a mis-
take to say that all testimony of a treat-
ing doctor m so tainted because he con-
versed with his patient's adversary that 
his testimony must be excluded. Such a 
rule would inevitably impede the search 
for truth. Nor can we say that the jus-
tice system should pay this price so that 
the doctor-patient relationship will not be 
bruised. Defendants ought to have the 
same right of access as plaintiffs have to 
potential witnesses, even if they are 
treating physicians. [Id. at 456, 480 A 2d 
223.] 
IV 
In resolving this issue, our objective is to 
accord adequate recognition to the compet-
ing interests that have been identified. Al-
though this litigation involves claims for 
wrongful death and medical malpractice, 
the same interests would be present in 
other types of personal injury litigation. 
The defendant's expressed concern is for 
the right to interview decedent's treating 
physicians, rather than be restricted to the 
formality, expense, and inconvenience of 
depositions conducted pursuant to the 
Court Rules An unexpressed interest, we 
assume, is the hope that one or more of 
these physicians might provide evidence or 
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testimony that would be helpful to the de-
fendant at trial. Unquestionably, defend-
ant's counsel would prefer to seek out such 
evidence or discuss the prospect of such 
testimony in an ex parte interview rather 
than during a deposition attended by plain-
tiff's counsel. 
The plaintiffs interest is twofold. The 
interest advanced as primary is the desire 
to protect from disclosure by the physician 
confidential information not relevant to the 
litigation and therefore still protected by 
the patient-physician privilege and the phy-
sician's professional obligation to preserve 
confidentiality. An equally if not more im-
portant interest of the plaintiff, although 
not specifically pressed before us, is the 
desire to preserve the physician's loyalty to 
the plaintiff in the hope that the physician 
will not voluntarily provide evidence or tes-
timony that will assist the defendant's 
cause. See Alexander v. Knight, supra, 
197 Pa.Super. at 79, 177 A 2d at 146 (Mem-
bers of the medical profession "owe their 
patients more than just medical care for 
which payment is exacted; there is a duty 
of total care; that includes and compre-
hends a duty to aid the patient in litigation, 
to render reports when necessary and to 
attend court when needed. That further 
includes a duty to refuse affirmative assist-
ance to the patient's antagonist in litiga-
tion."); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sure-
ty Co., supra, 243 F.Supp. at 799 (quoting 
Alexander v. Knight, supra, with approv-
al). Contra Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 
99 F.R.D. at 128 ("As a general proposition 
* * * no party to litigation has anything 
resembling a proprietary right to any wit-
ness's evidence. Absent a privilege no par-
ty is entitled to restrict an opponent's ac-
cess to a witness, however partial or impor-
tant to him, by insisting upon some notion 
of allegiance."). 
The physician's interest focuses on pre-
vention of inadvertent disclosure of infor-
mation still protected by the privilege, since 
an unauthorized disclosure of such infor-
mation may be unethical and actionable. 
Collaterally, the physician needs to be in-
formed that he need not cooperate if he 
believes that would compromise his profes-
sional responsibilities. 
[2,3] In our view, these competing in-
terests can be respected adequately with-
out requiring the formality of depositions 
in every case. The Rules regulating pre-
trial discovery do not purport to set forth 
the only methods by which information per-
tinent to the litigation may be obtained. 
Personal interviews, although not express-
ly referred to in our Rules, are an accepted, 
informal method of assembling facts and 
documents in preparation for trial. Their 
use should be encouraged as should other 
informal means of discovery that reduce 
the cost and time of trial preparation. 
Since it is unrealistic to anticipate that 
decedent's physicians will participate in 
such interviews without plaintiff's consent, 
plaintiff's counsel should provide written 
authorization to facilitate the conduct of 
interviews. If such authorizations are 
withheld unreasonably, their production 
can be compelled, as in this case, by mo-
tion. However, conditions should be im-
posed in the authorizations, or in orders 
compelling their issuance, that require de-
fendant's counsel to provide plaintiff's 
counsel with reasonable notice of the time 
and place of the proposed interviews. Ad-
ditionally, the authorizations or orders 
should require that defendant's counsel 
provide the physician with a description of 
the anticipated scope of the interview, and 
communicate with unmistakable clarity the 
fact that the physician's participation in an 
ex parte interview is voluntary. This pro-
cedure will afford plaintiff's counsel the 
opportunity to communicate with the physi-
cian, if necessary, in order to express any 
appropriate concerns as to the proper scope 
of the interview, and the extent to which 
plaintiff continues to assert the patient-
physician privilege with respect to that 
physician. 
Plaintiff may also seek and obtain a pro-
tective order if under the circumstances a 
proposed ex parte interview with a specific 
physician threatens to cause such substan-
CTY. COLL. OF MORRIS 
Cite as 495 A^d 
tial prejudice to plaintiff as to warrant the 
supervision of the trial court. Such super-
vision could take the form of an order 
requiring the presence of plaintiffs counsel 
during the interview or, in extreme cases, 
requiring defendant's counsel to proceed 
by deposition. We are satisfied that the 
flexibility afforded by our decision will per-
mit trial courts and counsel to fashion ap-
propriate procedures in unusual cases with-
out interfering unnecessarily with the use 
of personal interviews in routine cases. 
Notwithstanding this resolution, we 
deem the issue raised to be of sufficient 
complexity as to merit the prompt attention 
of the Civil Practice Committee, whose rec-
ommendation we will solicit with regard to 
the necessity for amending the Court Rules 
to deal with this issue more formally. 
Accordingly, the order of the Law Divi-
sion, as modified, is affirmed and the mat-
ter is remanded to that court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion. 
For modification and affirmance—Chief 
Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIF-
FORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, 
GARIBALDI and STEIN—7. 
Opposed—None. 
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COUNTY COLLEGE OF MORRIS 
STAFF ASSOCIATION and 
Victor Muller, Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
COUNTY COLLEGE OF MORRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued March 4, 1985. 
Decided Aug. 5, 1985. 
Petition for certification was made 
from an unreported decision of the Superi-
STAFF v. CTY. COLLEGE N.J. 865 
865 (NJ. 1985) 
or Court, Appellate Division reinstating an 
arbitrator's award of suspension of an em-
ployee following finding of misconduct. 
The Supreme Court, Clifford, J., held that: 
(1) arbitrator exceeded his authority in im-
posing the suspension, rather than termi-
nation, after he found employee miscon-
duct, by "reading into" contract a require-
ment for progressive discipline, and (2) em-
ployer did not lose its right to terminate 
employee by waiting three weeks after al-
leged incident to impose discipline, during 
which time it investigated charges and al-
lowed employee response. 
Reversed. 
Wilentz, C.J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Stein, J., joined. 
1. Arbitration <£=>1.2, 73.7(1) 
Arbitration is a device viewed favor-
ably by the courts and, towards that end, 
judicial interference with role of arbitrator 
is to be strictly limited; arbitrator's award 
is not to be cast aside lightly. 
2. Labor Relations ®=>483 
Scope of review of arbitrator's deter-
mination of contractual language in public 
employee contract is whether arbitration 
determination was reasonably debatable. 
3. Arbitration <®=76U) 
An arbitrator's award is subject to be-
ing vacated when it has been shown that a 
statutory basis justifies such action. N.J. 
S.A. 2A:24-8. 
4. Arbitration @=>29.1 
Labor Relations <3=>462 
When parties have agreed, through a 
contract, on a defined set of rules that are 
to govern the arbitration process, arbitra-
tor exceeds his powers when he ignores 
limited authority that contract confers; 
when an arbitration award does not draw 
its essence from the bargaining agreement, 
it will not be enforced by the courts. N.J. 
S.A. 2A:24-8. 
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the advertisements of the object.7 The ad-
vertisement was thus not introduced to 
prove that the statements of the manufac-
turer were true (which could be character-
ized as hearsay), rather, the advertisements 
were properly introduced to prove the 
"state of mind" of the community (which is 
not hearsay) Cf. Commonwealth v. Fish-
er, supra (the defendant used an advertise-
ment from a sporting good magazine to 
support his defense that a "Wyoming 
Knife" had a common lawful purpose as a 
hunting tool). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we find appel-
lant's claims are all without merit. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 
( o f MY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
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Pearlena MOSES, Appellant, 
v. 
Daniel T. McWILLIAMS, Esq., Marvin 
Krane, M.D., and Albert Einstein Medical 
Center. 




Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 
Argued Sept. 16, 1987. 
Filed Sept. 28, 1988. 
Patient brought suit against her physi-
cian alleging breach of confidentiality by 
doctor's ex parte pretrial discussions with 
medical malpractice defendant's attorney 
and his testimony at medical malpractice 
trial. The Court of Common Pleas, Phila-
7. Though an advertisement may properly be ad-
mitted as evidence tending to establish indirect-
ly the common purpose of an object, we in no 
way suggest that such evidence is conclusive as 
delaphia County, Nos. 4356 February 
Term, 1983 and 3167 September Term, 
Prattis, J., dismissed the complaints. On 
appeal, the Superior Court, Nos. 2062 and 
2063 Philadelphia 1985, Montemuro, J., 
held that: (1) patient could not assert cause 
of action for breach of confidentiality by 
physician as patient raised the issue by 
bringing a personal injury action; (2) pa-
tient's right to confidentiality is less than 
absolute; (3) neither constitutional nor 
common-law right to privacy in one's medi-
cal records is absolute; (4) patient waived 
physician/patient privilege when she insti-
tuted civil action for personal injuries; (5) 
doctor's pretrial statements and testimony 
were absolutely privileged from all civil 
liability; (6) absolute privilege for witness-
es extends to pretrial ex parte communica-
tions as well as to testimony; (7) doctor 
who gave out unrelated information could 
be liable for breach of confidentiality; (8) 
claim for inducement of breach failed; and 
(9) absolute privilege protected doctor from 
defamation liability. 
Affirmed. 
Cirillo, President Judge, filed a concur-
ring and dissenting opinion in which Olsz-
ewski and Tamilia, JJ., joined. 
Del Sole, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
1. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»15(9) 
Given patient's qualified right to priva-
cy in her medical records and reduced ex-
pectation of privacy as result of filing a 
civil suit for personal injuries, in conjunc-
tion with policy supporting physician-pa-
tient privilege and the absolute immunity 
from civil liability granted witnesses in ju-
dicial proceedings, patient could not assert 
cause of action for breach of confidentiality 
by physician who met with insurance repre-
sentatives and attorney of defendant in 
medical malpractice action and related rele-
vant information about patient's physical 
condition and further testified about the 
patient's condition at trial. 
to the object's common purpose. Indeed, one of 
the purposes of advertisement is to change the 
public perception of a product. 
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2. Physicians and Surgeons e=»15(9) 
Patient's right to confidentiality from 
physician is less than absolute. 18 P&XLS. 
A. § 5106; 53 P.S. § 24663; 11 P.S. § 2204; 
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909. 
3. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(9) 
In order for doctor's disclosure to be 
actionable at law, disclosure must be made 
without legal justification or excuse. 18 
Pa.C.S.A. § 5106; 53 P.S. § 24663; 11 P.S. 
§ 2204; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909. 
4. Constitutional Law e=>82(7) 
Patient's constitutional right to privacy 
about his medical records is qualified when 
that individual has filed suit for personal 
injuries. 
5. Torts <3=>8.5(2) 
Individual's right to privacy in his 
medical records is qualified when he has 
filed suit for personal injuries. 
6. Witnesses <3=>219(5) 
Patients waive the physician/patient 
privilege when they instigate civil actions 
for personal injuries. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929. 
7. Physicians and Surgeons <s»15(9) 
No cause of action arises from a doc-
tor's violation of the physician/patient priv-
ilege under the medical licensing statute. 
63 P.S. §§ 422.41, 422.41(8). 
8. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(9) 
Doctor's pretrial statements made to 
attorney of medical malpractice defendant 
and his testimony in medical malpractice 
action were absolutely privileged from all 
civil liability because they were made in 
regular course of judicial proceedings. 
9. Physicians and Surgeons ^ l S O ) 
Absolute privilege barred patient's 
claim for doctor's breach of confidentiality 
claim against doctor following doctor's tes-
timony in personal injury suit instigated by 
patient because patient had reduced expec-
tation of privacy upon instigation of the 
suit and doctor witness had performed 
same function as any other witness, aiding 
the fact finder in its truth-finding function. 
10, Libel and Slander e»38(l) 
Absolute immunity for witnesses in 
regular course of civil proceedings extends 
to pretrial ex parte communications. 
11. Libel and Slander ®=>Wh 
Although a doctor who grants a pri-
vate interview in connection with judicial 
proceedings would enjoy judicial privilege 
protecting him from liability for def-
amation, he could lose that privilege by 
disclosing information that has no relation 
to the underlying action. 
12. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(9) 
If a doctor makes statement clearly 
unrelated to a lawsuit during private inter-
view regarding litigation, there might be a 
cause of action for breach of confidentiality 
by the patient. 
13. Torts <3=>26(1) 
Upon plaintiffs failure to state cause 
of action for breach of confidentiality, her 
claims for inducement of that breach also 
failed. 
14. Libel and Slander e=>38(4) 
Absolute privilege protected doctor 
from defamation suit by patient for doc-
tor's testimony during medical malpractice 
trial. 
15. Libel and Slander <S=>38(1) 
Absolute privilege protected doctor 
from defamation suit by patient for doc-
tor's ex parte pretrial conference with 
agents of defendants during medical mal-
practice action which was instituted by pa-
tient against another doctor. 
16. Libel and Slander <s=>84, 85 
Plaintiff's failure to allege which state-
ments made by defendant were defam-
atory, or demonstrate that any such com-
munications were made to unprivileged oth-
er persons precluded defendant's def-
amation liability for those statements. 
17. Libel and Slander <3=>84, 85 
Complaint for defamation must, on its 
face, identify specifically what alleged de-
famatory statements were made and to 
whom they were made. 
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William Marvin, Philadelphia, for appel-
lant. 
H. Robert Fiebach, Philadelphia, for 
McWilliams, appellee. 
Howard M. Cyr, III, Philadelphia, for 
Krane, appellee. 
S. David Fineman, Philadelphia, for Al-
bert Einstein Medical Center, appellee. 
Before CIRILLO, President Judge, 
and BROSKY, OLSZEWSKI, DEL 
SOLE, MONTEMURO, TAMILIA, 
KELLY, POPOVICH and JOHNSON, 
JJ. 
MONTEMURO, Judge: 
This is a consolidated appeal from four 
orders issued by the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas dismissing the 
complaints of appellant Pearlena Moses in 
two separate actions in trespass, one 
against appellee Underwriters' Adjusting 
Company (Underwriters), the other against 
appellees Albert Einstein Medical Center 
(Albert Einstein), Dr. Marvin Krane, and 
Daniel T. McWilliams, Esq.1 Both cases 
arose from a medical malpractice action 
filed by appellant following a hysterectomy 
she underwent in the summer of 1977. 
In July of 1977, appellant was admitted 
to the emergency room at Albert Einstein. 
There, an intern diagnosed her as suffering 
from pelvic inflammatory disease. She 
was released with instructions to take a 
prescription for antibiotics. Her condition 
worsened, necessitating her admission to 
another hospital where she came under the 
care of appellee Dr. Marvin Krane. On 
July 7, 1977, he performed a total hysterec-
tomy on her and continued to treat her 
until he released her to the care of her 
private physician in November 1977. Ap-
pellant then brought suit against Albert 
Einstein Medical Center, alleging that the 
1. This consolidated appeal was originally heard 
by a three-judge panel of this Court. That panel 
determined that because the case involved is-
sues both of first impression and of great socie-
tal importance, it should be certified for en 
banc review. 
2. Because we here review an order granting a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, we ac-
care she received there had been negligent 
and had necessitated the hysterectomy. 
In the consolidated actions now before 
us, appellant alleges2 that, in the malprac-
tice action, Albert Einstein hired Under-
writers to manage its defense of the case. 
Underwriters, in turn, retained appellee 
Daniel T. McWilliams to represent Albert 
Einstein. Underwriters wrote to Dr. 
Krane and asked that he contact its repre-
sentatives to discuss appellant's medical 
condition. Neither appellant nor her attor-
ney were notified of this request. Dr. 
Krane complied with the request and, in 
conversations with both an Underwriters 
employee and with McWilliams, revealed 
information that he had gained in the 
course of his treatment of appellant. 
Appellant claims that she first became 
aware of Dr. Krane's involvement in the 
case when her attorney was notified by Mr. 
McWilliams that he intended to call Dr. 
Krane as an expert witness at trial. Appel-
lant's counsel informed Dr. Krane at that 
time that his communications with Mr. 
McWilliams were unauthorized and should 
cease immediately. Despite this injunction, 
Dr. Krane continued to meet with defense 
counsel, allowed McWilliams to review and 
copy portions of appellant's patient file, 
and testified at trial as a fact witness.3 
Appellant contends that as her treating 
physician Dr. Krane had a duty to refrain 
both from taking any actions which would 
be adverse to her interests in the malprac-
tice litigation and from making any disclo-
sures to other parties of information 
gained in the course of his treatment of 
her, unless authorized to do so either by 
her or by law. She also alleges that Dr. 
Krane had knowledge of or should have 
known of the provisions of the Interprofes-
sional Code, the American Medical Associa-
tion Principles of Medical Ethics, and the 
cept as true all of appellant's well-pleaded aver-
ments of fact. See Capanna v. Travelers Insur-
ance Co., 355 Pa.Super. 219, 513 A.2d 397 
(1986). 
3. The Honorable Stanley M. Greenberg of the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ruled that 
Dr. Krane could not testify as an expert witness, 
but might do so as a fact witness. 
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Hippocratic Oath, all of which provide for 
the maintenance of confidentiality between 
physician and patient. Appellant argues 
that because Dr. Krane ignored these pro-
visions, and breached the confidence gained 
in treating her, he should be liable in tort 
for breach of the physician/patient privi-
lege. She further asserts that Albert Ein-
stein, McWilliams and Underwriters should 
be liable for inducing that breach. Accord-
ingly, our initial inquiry on appeal, a ques-
tion of first impression, is whether a treat-
ing physician's unauthorized and judicially 
unsupervised communications with his pa-
tient's adversary in a medical malpractice 
action are actionable as a breach of physi-
cian/patient confidentiality. Appellant ar-
gues, first, that a general cause of action 
for breach of the physician/patient confi-
dentiality should exist; second, that a phy-
sician's judicially unsupervised and unau-
thorized communications with a patient's 
adversaries in litigation should give rise to 
that cause of action; and, third, that in 
such a context the defense of absolute priv-
ilege should not be available to the physi-
cian.4 Appellant's last two questions 
presented concern her claim for defamation 
and are intertwined with the physician/pa-
tient confidentiality theory. She argues 
that the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment before depositions were 
concluded, and also that the appellees 
4. We need not concern ourselves with appel-
lant's first argument that a general cause of 
action for breach of the physician/patient confi-
dentiality should exist. The issue, as framed, is 
too broad. We need only to focus on the nar-
row factual context of this case. We note, how-
ever, that a majority of jurisdictions that have 
considered the broad issue of whether to recog-
nize a general cause of action for a physician's 
breach of confidentiality have allowed such a 
claim. However, our research has revealed no 
court from any jurisdiction that has allowed 
recovery against a physician for breach of confi-
dentiality under facts similar to those alleged in 
this case. See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 
328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 
M.D., 127 Misc.2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1985). 
When the cause of action has been recognized, 
it is in cases where there have been extra-judi-
cial disclosures of confidential information or 
in cases, such as those involving custody, where 
the plaintiffs physical condition has not been in 
issue. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 
287 So.2d 824 (1974) (physician disclosed confi-
dential information to plaintiffs employer); 
should not be accorded the absolute privi-
lege defense where the patient's confiden-
tiality rights have been breached. We af-
firm the trial court's orders. 
[1] We first consider appellant's claim 
for breach of confidentiality and do so in 
light of the standard applicable for review 
of a judgment on the pleadings:5 We ac-
cept as true all well-pleaded averments of 
fact and will uphold the trial court's deci-
sion only "in cases which are so free from 
doubt that trial would clearly be a fruitless 
exercise." Capanna v. Travelers Insur-
ance Co., 355 Pa.Super. 219, 226, 513 A.2d 
397, 401 (1986). We find that within the 
narrow factual context of this case, appel-
lant has failed to state a cause of action for 
breach of confidentiality. To find other-
wise would undermine several well-estab-
lished principles of this Commonwealth. 
We must keep in mind that when Dr. 
Krane made his disclosures, appellant had 
voluntarily instituted a medical malpractice 
action against Albert Einstein and had 
thereby placed in issue her medical condi-
tion. Given a patient's qualified right to 
privacy in his or her medical records and an 
individual's reduced expectation of privacy 
as a result of filing a civil suit for personal 
injuries in conjunction with policies sup-
porting both the physician/patient privilege 
statute6 and the absolute immunity from 
MacDonald v. dinger, M.D., 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (psychiatrist revealed confi-
dential information to plaintiffs wife); Doe v. 
Roe, 93 Misc.2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977) 
(psychiatrist, without plaintiffs consent, pub-
lished a book containing verbatim accounts of 
plaintiffs feelings); Schafjer v. Spicer, 88 S.D. 
36, 215 N.W.2d 134 (1974) (in a custody case, 
psychiatrist gave to the attorney of the patient's 
ex-husband an affidavit containing information 
with regard to his patient's mental health, which 
was deemed inadmissible at hearing); Berry v. 
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) 
(doctor revealed information about plaintiff to 
another doctor for the purpose of conveying the 
information to the parents of a woman contem-
plating marriage to plaintiff). 
5. As to the claim for breach of confidentiality 
against Dr. Krane, the trial court granted a 
judgment on the pleadings, not summary judg-
ment. See Trial Court Opinion at 3, 5. 
6. 42 Pa.CS. § 5929. 
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civil liability granted to witnesses in judi-
cial proceedings, we will not recognize the 
cause of action for breach of confidentiality 
as pled in this case.1 
Appellant argues that a physician's duty 
to maintain confidentiality outside of for-
mal court proceedings is based upon the 
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient re-
lationship, the constitutional right of priva-
cy, and the ethical principles of the medical 
profession. 
[2,3] We first note that a patient's 
right to confidentiality is less than abso-
lute. In order for a disclosure to be action-
able at law, the disclosure must be made 
without legal justification or excuse. The 
law is replete with statutory justifications 
for disclosure that are deemed to outweigh 
the patient's right to confidentiality. For 
example, a physician has a duty to report 
otherwise confidential information relating 
to wounds or injuries inflicted by deadly 
weapons (18 Pa.C.S.S. § 5106), contagion 
(53 Pa.S.A. § 24663), child abuse (11 Pa.S. 
A. § 2204), and medical history in cases of 
adoption (23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909). While the 
existence of reporting requirements is not 
controlling on the issue before us, it indi-
cates the appropriateness of balancing the 
competing interests at stake when we eval-
uate the scope of the physician-patient priv-
ilege and the physician's duty of non-disclo-
sure. 
[4] In In Re June 1979 Allegheny 
County Investigating Grand Jury, 490 
7. Our tort law has evolved such that every al-
leged wrong or injury does not have a legal 
remedy. Cf. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The 
Law of Torts § 1 (5th ed. 1984) ("[t]here are 
many interferences with the plaintiffs interests, 
including negligently causing mere mental suf-
fering without physical consequences ... . for 
which the law will give no remedy .. ."). Be-
fore we grant relief to a plaintiff, we must 
reflect upon the principles and policies of this 
Commonwealth that will be affected by creating 
a new cause of action. We do not find that this 
case warrants establishing a new cause of ac-
tion. If Dr. Krane has behaved unethically, the 
medical profession can discipline him as would 
the legal profession reprimand a lawyer who 
had violated the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. See, e.g., Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So.2d 
858 (Fla.1984) ("whether [a doctor] has violated 
the ethical standards of his profession is a mat-
ter to be addressed by the profession itself). 
Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 (1980), then Chief 
Justice Eagen, writing for a three-judge 
plurality, concluded that "[disclosure of 
confidences made by a patient to a physi-
cian, or even of medical data concerning 
the individual patient could, under certain 
circumstances, pose such a serious threat 
to a patient's right not to have personal 
matters revealed that it would be impermis-
sible under either the United States Consti-
tution or the Pennsylvania Constitution." 
Id. at 149-153, 415 A.2d at 77-78. How-
ever, as evidenced by the plurality's deci-
sion not to protect from discovery the par-
ticular medical records in that case,8 the 
constitutional right to privacy concerning 
medical information is qualified. In that 
case, the court acknowledged that there 
would be "a limited invasion of privacy" 
but considered it "justified under the cir-
cumstances." Id. at 152 n. 11, 415 A.2d at 
78 n. 11. See also Denoncourt v. Com-
monwealth State Ethics Commission, 504 
Pa. 191, 470 A.2d 945 (1983) (the constitu-
tional right of privacy is not absolute). 
[5] Additionally, in tort law we recog-
nize a right to privacy that is not constitu-
tionally based. In Forster v. Manchester, 
410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963), our su-
preme court defined the right as an "inter-
est in not having [one's] affairs known to 
others.1' Id. at 194-98,189 A.2d at 149-50. 
The invasion of privacy is actionable when 
there is an unreasonable and serious inter-
ference with one's privacy interest.9 None-
8. In In Re June 1979 Allegheny County Investi-
gating Grand Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 
(1980), a subpoena was issued for certain tissue 
sample reports as part of an investigation in-
volving the use and misuse of county facilities, 
funds, employees, and equipment. The reports 
would allow the grand jury to determine the 
names of the patients whose tissue had been 
submitted for testing. The supreme court con-
cluded that the patients' physician-patient privi-
lege and right to privacy were not offended by 
the subpoena. 
9. An invasion of privacy occurs when there is 
an "interference with the interest of the individ-
ual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a 
secluded and private life, free from the prying 
eyes, ears and publications of others." Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652A comment b 
(1977). 
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theless, an individual's right to privacy is 
clearly qualified when that individual has 
filed suit for personal injuries. Forster, 
supra. In Forster, a plaintiff who was 
suing for personal injuries allegedly sus-
tained in an automobile accident, was 
placed under surveillance by a private de-
tective hired by defendant's insurance 
carrier. The purpose of the investigation 
was to record plaintiffs daily activities to 
ascertain the freedom of movement of her 
limbs. Because she felt the surveillance 
was invasive, plaintiff instituted suit 
against the detective for invasion of priva-
cy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Our supreme court found reason-
able the manner in which the investigation 
was conducted and denied recovery on the 
invasion of privacy claim. The Court stat-
ed that 
[i]n determining the extent of the inter-
est to be protected, we must take cogni-
zance of the fact that appellant has made 
a claim for personal injuries It is 
not uncommon for defendants in accident 
cases to employ investigators to check on 
the validity of claims against them. 
Thus, by making a claim for personal 
injuries appellant must expect reason-
able inquiry and investigation to be 
made of her claim and to that extent 
her interest in privacy is circum-
scribed. 
Id. at 196-97, 189 A.2d at 150 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). See also Glenn 
v. Kerlin, 248 So.2d 834, 836 (La.App.1971) 
(although that jurisdiction recognizes a 
right to privacy and makes the invasion of 
that right actionable, once plaintiff has 
filed a suit for personal injuries and then 
attempts to recover in tort for allegedly 
wrongful disclosures by his doctor, plain-
tiff "no longer may claim the sanctity of 
his privacy"). In Forster, the supreme 
court concluded that that there is "much 
social utility to be gained" from investiga-
tion of claims because "[i]t is in the best 
interests of society that valid claims be 
ascertained and fabricated claims be ex-
posed." 410 Pa. at 197, 189 A.2d at 150. 
The words of the supreme court in Forster 
are equally applicable to the case at bar. 
When Dr. Krane made his disclosures, ap-
pellant had already commenced a medical 
malpractice action wherein she alleged per-
sonal injuries. With the filing of suit, ap-
peJJant's privacy expectations were reduced 
to the extent that she could anticipate that 
her claims would be investigated. It is in 
society's best interest that malpractice 
claims be investigated at the earliest possi-
ble stage to determine their validity. 
[6] Similarly, the Pennsylvania physi-
cian-patient privilege statute reflects the 
concept that there is a reduction in a pa-
tient's privacy interest and right to confi-
dentiality when he or she files suit for 
personal injuries. The statute provides 
that: 
[n]o physician shall be allowed, in any 
civil matter, to disclose any information 
which he acquired in attending the pa-
tient in a professional capacity, which 
shall tend to blacken the character of the 
patient, without consent of said patient, 
except in civil matters brought by such 
patient, for damages on account of per-
sonal injuries. 
42 Pa.C.S. § 5929 (emphasis added). By 
enacting this statute, our legislature has 
weighed competing policies to determine at 
what point the physician-patient privilege is 
lost or surrendered and has concluded that 
this loss or surrender occurs when a party 
institutes a civil action "on account of per-
sonal injuries." Appellant contends, how-
ever, that the statute sets forth the param-
eters of the testimonial privilege and that 
the exception does not apply outside of 
formal court proceedings. It was enacted, 
she argues, to balance a patient's right to 
privacy against the "unquestioned need for 
evidence in court*1 Brief of Appellant at 
27 (emphasis added). 
The statute should not be interpreted so 
narrowly that it encompasses only situa-
tions involving formal court proceedings. 
According to the canons of construction 
used in this Commonwealth, words in a 
statute are to be accorded their plain mean-
ing. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 
326, 446 A.2d 583 (1982); 1 Pa.C.S. 
§ 1903(a). Nothing in the physician-patient 
privilege statute evinces a legislative intent 
that the exception for "civil matters 
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brought by the patient" should apply only 
to disclosures made in a court-supervised 
setting. Patients waive the privilege when 
they institute civil actions for personal inju-
ries. The statute applies to disclosures 
without reference to the stage in the pro-
ceedings at which they are made. The 
statute extends the privilege to the patient, 
not to the physician. Romanowicz v. Ro-
manotvicz, 213 Pa.Super. 382, 248 A.2d 238 
(1968). By filing actions for personal inju-
ries, the plaintiff-patients waive their privi-
lege and, in effect, implicitly consent to 
disclosures by their physicians concerning 
matters relating to the plaintiff-patients' 
medical conditions. 
Moreover, contrary to appellant's asser-
tions, ethical considerations and the Com-
monwealth's medical licensing statutes do 
not provide a clear-cut source for recogniz-
ing a cause of action for breach under the 
facts as alleged in this case. The Hippoc-
ratic Oath does not serve as an absolute 
bar to disclosures: "Whatever in connec-
tion with my professional practice, or not in 
connection with it, I may see or hear in the 
lives of men which ought not to be spoken 
abroad I will not divulge " Similarly, 
the 1980 statement by the American Medi-
cal Association concerning a doctor's re-
lease of confidential information is broad, 
provides little guidance, and does not in 
any event, prohibit Dr. Krane's actions: "A 
physician shall respect the right of pa-
tients, of colleagues, and of other health 
professionals, and shall safeguard patient 
confidences within the constraints of the 
law.*1 Principle IV of the Medical Ethics of 
the American Medical Association (in effect 
at the time of Dr. Krane's disclosures). 
One of our central concerns in this case is 
to determine what "ought not to be spoken 
abroad" by a treating physician in the con-
text of a medical malpractice action and 
what are "the constraints of the law." See 
generally Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: 
The Uncertain Role of the Physician in 
the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. 
L.Rev. 255 (1984). Even the Current Opin-
ions of the Judicial Council of the AMA do 
not absolutely bar disclosures of confidenc-
10. Unprofessional conduct is defined to include 
that which is a "departure from or failing to 
es. In fact, Section 5.07 states that "[a] 
physician should respect the patient's ex-
pectations of confidentiality concerning 
medical records that involve the patient's 
care and treatment." As we have already 
noted, an individual's expectations of confi-
dentiality are diminished when that individ-
ual files a civil action for personal injuries. 
To allow recovery at law for conduct such 
as Dr. Krane's that occurred within the 
context of a judicial action voluntarily insti-
tuted by appellant would ignore the fact 
that appellant's privacy interest was dimin-
ished by her commencement of the mal-
practice suit. 
[7] Finally, Pennsylvania's medical li-
censing statute, 63 P.S. § 422.41, does not 
provide appellant with a basis for a cause 
of action. The statute proscribes "unpro-
fessional conduct."10 The only sanctions 
that can be imposed upon a physician for 
unprofessional conduct are refusal, revoca-
tion or suspension by the board of the 
doctor's license. There is no provision for 
an independent cause of action against the 
doctor for money damages, nor is there any 
indication that the General Assembly in-
tended to create one. 
[8] The policy of granting immunity 
from civil liability in the context of judicial 
proceedings also compels a finding that 
appellant has failed to state a cause of 
action under the facts as alleged in this 
case. Dr. Krane's statements were abso-
lutely privileged from civil liability because 
they were made "in the regular course of 
judicial proceedings and . . . [were] perti-
nent and material" to the litigation. See 
Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 220, 507 A.2d 
351, 355 (1986) (quoting Kemper v. Fort, 
219 Pa. 85, 93, 67 A. 991, 994-95 (1907)). 
See also Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F.Supp. 
1118, 1121 (D.Del.1982) ("[sjtrict legal rele-
vance need not be demonstrated; instead 
the allegedly defamatory statements must 
have only some connection to the subject 
matter of the pending action"). In the case 
at bar, there is no allegation that Dr. 
Krane's statements were not relevant or 
conform to an ethical or quality standard of the 
profession." 63 P.S. § 422.41(8). 
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not pertinent to the litigation. Further-
more, "communications pertinent to any 
stage of judicial proceedings are accorded 
an absolute privilege." Pelagatti v. Co-
ken, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 436, 536 A.2d 1337, 
1344 (1988) (emphasis added). See also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588 com-
ment b (1977) (the privilege protects a wit-
ness "while engaged in private conferences 
with an attorney at law with reference to 
proposed litigation"). 
The United States Supreme Court, dis-
cussing the reasons supporting this policy 
of immunity, has stated: 
The immunity of parties and witnesses 
from subsequent damages liability for 
their testimony in judicial proceedings 
was well established in English common 
law. . . . In the words of one 19th-centu-
ry court, in damages suits against wit-
nesses, "the claims of the individual 
must yield to the dictates of public poli-
cy, which requires that the paths which 
lead to ascertainment of truth should be 
left as free and unobstructed as possi-
ble/' A witness' apprehension of subse-
quent damages liability might induce two 
forms of censorship. First, witnesses 
might be reluctant to come forward to 
testify. And once a witness is on the 
stand, his testimony might be distorted 
by the fear of subsequent liability. 
Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-333, 
103 S.Ct. 1108, 1112-1114, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 
(1983) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
See also Collins v. Walden, 613 F.Supp. 
1306, 1314 (N.D.Ga.1985), affd without 
opinion, 784 F.2d 402 (Uth Cir.1986) (the 
purpose of witness immunity is to ensure 
that the judicial process functions "unim-
peded by fear on the part of its participants 
that they will be sued for damages for 
their part in the proceedings"). 
While it is true that immunity from civil 
liability in judicial proceedings has been 
applied most frequently in defamation ac-
tions, many courts, including those in Penn-
sylvania, have extended the immunity from 
civil liability to other alleged torts when 
they occur in connection with judicial pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Brown v. The Dela-
ware Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa. 
Super. 629, 539 A.2d 1372 (1988) (mutilation 
of a corpse, civil conspiracy, and assault 
and battery); Pelagatti v. Cohen, supra 
(interference with contractual relationship); 
Thompson v. Sikov, 340 Pa.Super. 382, 490 
A.2d 472 (1985) (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Passon v. Spritzer, 
277 Pa.Super. 498, 419 A.2d 1258 (1980) 
(malicious use and abuse of process and 
invasion of privacy); Triester v. 191 Ten-
ants Association, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 415 
A.2d 698 (1979) (disparagement of title). 
See also Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 
869 (1st Cir.1984) (interference with con-
tractual relationship); Blake v. Levy, 191 
Conn. 257, 464 A.2d 52 (1983) (same); Mid-
dlesex Concrete Products and Excavating 
Corp. v. Carteret Industrial Association, 
68 N J.Super. 85,172 A.2d 22 (1961) (same). 
Such an extension of immunity evinces the 
strong policy behind the privilege: to leave 
reasonably unobstructed the paths which 
lead to the ascertainment of truth, Briscoe, 
supra, and to encourage witnesses with 
knowledge of facts relevant to judicial pro-
ceedings to give "complete and unintimidat-
ed testimony," Binder v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 324, 275 A.2d 53, 
56 (1971). Recognizing a cause of action 
for breach of confidentiality in the factual 
context of the case at bar will undermine 
this policy. As one court observed: 
[i]f the policy, which in defamation ac-
tions affords an absolute privilege or im-
munity to statements made in judicial 
and quasi-judicial proceedings is really to 
mean anything then we must not permit 
its circumvention by affording an almost 
equally unrestricted action under a dif-
ferent label. 
Hoover v. Van Stone, 540 F.Supp. 1118, 
1124 (D Del.1982) (quoting Rainier's Dair-
ies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 
117 A.2d 889, 895 (1955)) (case involving 
claims of defamation, tortious interference 
with contractual relationships, abuse of 
process and barratry)). The court in Hoo-
ver also stated that: 
[the counts of tortious interference with 
contractual relationships, abuse of pro-
cess, and barratry] are all predicated on 
the very same acts providing the basis 
for the defamation claim. Application of 
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the absolute privilege solely to the def-
amation count . . . would be an empty 
gesture indeed, if, because of artful 
pleading, the plaintiff could still be 
forced to defend itself against the same 
conduct regarded as defamatory. Main-
tenance of these kindred causes of ac-
tion, moreover, would equally restrain 
the ability of judges, parties, counsel 
and witnesses to speak and write freely 
during the course of judicial proceed-
ings. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
[9] Appellant argues that the cases 
where the absolute privilege has been ex-
tended beyond the defamation claim can be 
distinguished from the case at bar. She 
argues that "plaintiffs in those cases had 
no basis to complain of the fact that the 
communication was made ...[;] their 
grievance went solely to the content of the 
communication." Brief of Appellant at 61. 
However, appellant's claim is based upon 
the content of Dr. Krane's communications, 
not just the fact of communication. Appel-
lant has lodged a claim against Dr. Krane 
because he disclosed information pertaining 
to her medical condition, not merely be-
cause he spoke with Mr. McWilliams and 
the insurance representative.11 
[10] Moreover, witness immunity 
should and does extend to pre-trial commu-
nications. The policy of providing for rea-
sonably unobstructed access to the relevant 
facts is no less compelling at the pre-trial 
stage of judicial proceedings. As one fed-
eral district court has stated in a case in-
volving claims of negligence, fraudulent 
and innocent misrepresentation, defamation 
and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
11. It might be argued that while we should 
extend this blanket immunity to lay witnesses, a 
doctor should not be protected because of the 
unique relationship between doctor and patient; 
doctors should have a duty greater than lay 
witnesses to protect confidences that are re-
vealed to them by virtue of their professional 
roles. We dismiss that argument as the United 
States Supreme Court dismissed a similar argu-
ment in Briscoe v. Lahue, supra. In that case, 
where police officers were being sued under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 which allows convicted persons to 
assert damage claims against police officers 
who gave perjured testimony at their trials, the 
Court noted that the immunity analysis rests on 
tress brought by a defendant-doctor in a 
malpractice action against another doctor 
who had prepared advisory medical reports 
for a plaintiff in anticipation of a malprac-
tice action: 
The overriding concern for disclosure of 
pertinent and instructive expert opinions 
before and during medical malpractice 
actions is no less significant than the 
clearly recognized need for all relevant 
factual evidence during the course of liti-
gation Physicians who wish to limit 
groundless malpractice suits obviously 
would support review of potential mal-
practice claims by fellow members of the 
medical profession. If doctors who pro-
vide expert reports are subjected to civil 
liability for the contents of their reports, 
fewer doctors will be willing to evaluate 
potential malpractice claims in advance 
of litigation. Rather, medical experts 
will only provide sworn expert testimony 
in medical malpractice cases that are in 
progress because witness immunity will 
protect those, and only those, state-
ments. In the absence of expert review, 
then, meritless medical malpractice suits 
will be eradicated less frequently prior to 
filing. This result is neither desirable 
nor efficient. 
Kahn v. Burman, 673 F.Supp. 210, 213 
(E.D.Mich.1987) (citations omitted). The 
same principles apply to the case at bar. 
By granting immunity from liability to the 
doctor-potential witness for disclosures 
made that are relevant to the malpractice 
claim, the "paths which lead to ascertain-
ment of truth" are left reasonably unob-
structed, Briscoe, supra, 460 U.S. at 333, 
103 S.Ct. at 1114. Meritless medical mal-
"functional categories," not on the status of the 
witness. 460 U.S. at 342, 103 S.Ct. at 1119. The 
judicial process depends on the functions of its 
various "players," and immunity is granted in 
order to facilitate the judicial process. A doc-
tor-witness who is testifying as a fact witness 
performs the same function as any other wit-
ness: to present evidence through testimony to 
aid the tribunal in its truth-finding function. 
The functioning of the tribunal is seriously 
handicapped if witnesses, whether they be doc-
tors or lay persons, fear liability from state-
ments made by them that have some relation to 
the litigation. 
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practice claims can be disposed of at the 
earliest possible stage of litigation by al-
lowing free access to material and relevant 
facts once a claimant has filed suit. Be-
cause the plaintiffs expectations of privacy 
have been reduced with the instigation of 
litigation, there is no breach of confidential-
ity. We therefore recognize the absolute 
privilege as a bar to the claim for breach of 
confidentiality against Dr. Krane. 
We note, as have other courts, that ex 
parte interviews are less costly12 and eas-
ier to schedule than depositions, are condu-
cive to candor and spontaneity, are a cost-
efficient method of eliminating non-essen-
tial witnesses in a case where a plaintiff 
might have a number of treating physi-
cians, and allow both parties to confer with 
the treating physicians. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 
1983); State of Missouri, ex rel. Stuffle-
bam, M.D. v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882, 
888 (Mo.App.1985). Moreover, as the dis-
trict court in Eli Lilly pointed out, al-
though the purpose of the physician-patient 
privilege is to promote open communica-
tion, "the privilege was never intended . . . 
to be used as a trial tactic by which a party 
entitled to invoke it may control to his 
advantage the timing and circumstances of 
the relevant information he must inevita-
bly see revealed at some time" 99 F.R.D. 
at 128 (emphasis added).13 Further, the 
12. Cf. Lazorick v. Brown, 195 NJ.Super. 444, 
480 A.2d 223 (1984). In that case, the New 
Jersey Superior Court held that plaintiff-patient 
could not prevent his adversaries in litigation 
from speaking privately with his current treat-
ing physicians about any unprivileged matter. 
The court stated that 
the provision for admission at trial of video-
taped depositions of a treating physician or 
expert witness, reflects the need to use less 
costly and time consuming means of produc-
ing evidence. It is not only costly to all par-
ties to litigation but it may be impractical and 
inefficient to produce all treating doctors for 
depositions without knowing in advance 
whether their testimony will be useful or 
helpful in resolving disputed issues. 
Id. at 454-55, 480 A.2d at 229. 
13. Professor Wigmore states an analogous con-
cern: 
The injury to justice by the repression of the 
facts of corporal injury and disease is much 
greater than any injury which might be done 
argument for preventing full disclosure of 
patient confidences rests upon a policy that 
seeks to promote the health of the citizen. 
Informed diagnoses are to some extent im-
possible without complete candor by the 
patient concerning his life and habits. To 
encourage that candor, a cloak of confiden-
tiality is placed upon communications by a 
patient to his doctor. Nevertheless, lifting 
that cloak when a patient puts his or her 
physical condition in issue by filing suit 
does not make it more likely that patients 
will cease communicating with their doc-
tors when they seek treatment for illness-
es. It is in a patient's best interest to be 
candid with his or her doctor in order to 
obtain the most informed treatment possi-
ble. 
Allowing ex parte interviews with treat-
ing physicians does not open the door to 
any and every disclosure by a doctor con-
cerning a plaintiffs medical condition. 
Rather, disclosure should be limited to that 
which is pertinent and material to the un-
derlying litigation. If disclosures are nei-
ther pertinent nor material, they will be 
inadmissible at trial. Moreover, by issuing 
protective orders, a court can place restric-
tions on the scope of medical discovery 
without actually prohibiting ex parte inter-
views. For example, in the malpractice 
litigation underlying the instant action, the 
trial court issued an order to the effect that 
by disclosure. And furthermore, the few top-
ics—such as venereal disease and abortion— 
upon which secrecy might be seriously de-
sired by the patient come into litigation ordi-
narily in such issues (as when they constitute 
cause for a bill of divorce or a charge of 
crime) that for these very facts common sense 
and common justice demand that the desire 
for secrecy shall not be listened to 
The real support for the privilege seems to 
be mainly the weight of professional medical 
opinion pressing upon the legislature. And 
that opinion is founded on a natural repug-
nance to being the means of disclosure of 
personal confidence. But the medical profes-
sion should reflect that the principal issues in 
which justice asks for such disclosure are 
those—personal injury and life and accident 
insurance—which the patient himself has vol-
untarily brought into court. Hence, the physi-
cian has no reason to reproach himself with 
the consequences which justice requires. 
8 Wigmore. Evidence § 2380(a) (McNaughton 
rev. 1961). 
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Dr. Krane could testify on Albert Einstein 
Medical Center's behalf only as a fact wit-
ness, and not as an expert See also State 
of Missouri, ex rel Stufflebam v. Appel-
quist, supra. 
[11,12] Although a doctor who grants a 
private interview in connection with judicial 
proceedings would enjoy the judicial privi-
lege protecting him from liability for def-
amation, he could lose that privilege by 
disclosing information that has no relation 
to the underlying action. Similarly, if a 
doctor makes statements clearly unrelated 
to a lawsuit, there might be a cause of 
action stated against him for breach of 
confidentiality. We, however, need not 
make such a finding here because that 
issue is not before us. See State of Mis-
souri, ex rel Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 
694 S.W.2d at 889 (Hogan, P.J. concurring, 
noted that although a court might autho-
rize ex parte interviews with a doctor, "the 
physician who grants the interview is still 
'on his own' . . . in determining whether the 
scope of the questions . . . is so extensive 
as to require him to expose himself to 
liability . . . , [and] that a decision to grant 
an interview is not without risk, and must 
be strictly voluntary"). 
[13] Because we find that appellant has 
not stated a cause of action for breach of 
confidentiality under the facts of the in-
stant case, her claims for inducement of 
that breach must necessarily fail. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the trial court's orders 
dismissing appellant's claims for breach of 
confidentiality and inducement to breach. 
[14] We now turn to appellant's second 
group of questions involving the claim for 
defamation and find that the absolute privi-
lege which protects statements made in a 
judicial context precludes appellant's def-
amation claim. See Pelagatti supra, 370 
Pa.Super. at 438, 536 A.2d at 1345; Post v. 
Mendel, supra, 510 Pa. at 220, 507 A.2d at 
355. Our discussion concerning the appli-
cation of the absolute privilege to bar ap-
pellant's breach of confidentiality claim is 
equally applicable to the defamation claim. 
[15] Appellant also argues that the 
grant of summary judgment was prema-
ture in this case because she was unable to 
depose McWilliams concerning a conversa-
tion that he had had with Dr. Krane after 
the conclusion of the trial in her medical 
malpractice action. Because McWilliams 
claimed the work product privilege during 
trial, both parties agreed to defer his depo-
sition until after the disposition of the mal-
practice suit. We find that, again, conver-
sations between Dr. Krane and McWilliams 
are covered by the absolute privilege ac-
corded relevant statements made in the 
course of litigation. The litigation in the 
medical malpractice suit was not concluded, 
post-trial motions were still to be decided, 
and the law suit with which we are con-
cerned was still pending. 
[16,17] We also note that appellant 
failed to allege which statements made dur-
ing the conversation were defamatory. Al-
though she had not yet deposed McWil-
liams before filing her complaint, she had 
deposed Dr. Krane. A complaint for def-
amation must, on its face, identify specifi-
cally what allegedly defamatory state-
ments were made, and to whom they were 
made. Failure to do so will subject the 
complaint to dismissal for lack of publica-
tion. See Gross v. United Engineers and 
Constructors, Inc., 224 Pa.Super. 233, 235, 
302 A.2d 370, 372 (1973); see also Raneri 
v. DePolo, 65 Pa.Commw. 183, 186, 441 
A.2d 1373, 1375 (1982). Further, the trial 
court found that all the defamatory state-
ments that were alleged with specificity 
were made to privileged persons. Appel-
lant did allege in her complaint that defam-
atory remarks were made to "other per-
sons"; ostensibly, these were non-privi-
leged communications. She has failed, 
however, to make to this Court, or to the 
trial court, any argument that these other 
persons actually could have existed. She 
only claims that failure to permit her to 
have access to McWilliams' records pre-
vented her from obtaining corroborating 
information. 
We find that it would be unreasonable to 
draw the inference from the few facts with 
which appellant has presented us that de-
famatory statements were made in a non-
privileged context. We hold therefore that 
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in dismissing her claim for defamation. 
The orders of the trial court are af-
firmed. 
CIRILLO, President Judge, files a 
concurring and dissenting Opinion in 
which OLSZEWSKI and TAMILIA, JJ., 
join. 
DEL SOLE, J., files a concurring 
statement. 
CIRILLO, President Judge, 
concurring and dissenting. 
Because I disagree with the majority's 
resolution of the issues involved in this 
case, I respectfully dissent in part and con-
cur in part I agree with the majority's 
disposition of the defamation claim before 
us. I believe, however, that some cause of 
action should exist in this Commonwealth 
for a physician's breach of the duty of 
confidentiality to a patient. Because the 
majority finds that Moses is precluded 
from stating a claim for breach by her 
underlying medical malpractice action, it 
fails to reach this issue. I would hold that 
such a cause of action exists, and that 
Moses has alleged sufficient facts to make 
out a claim for breach. 
In July of 1977, Pearlena Moses was 
admitted to the emergency room of Albert 
Einstein Medical Center, an appellee in this 
case. Moses was diagnosed by an intern as 
suffering from pelvic inflammatory dis-
ease, and treated for that condition. Mo-
ses' symptoms worsened, and she was re-
ferred by her family doctor to appellee Dr. 
Marvin Krane, who specialized in gynecolo-
gy and obstetrics. Dr. Krane performed a 
total abdominal hysterectomy on Moses, re-
moving both ovaries, the uterus, and the 
fallopian tubes. Dr. Krane continued to 
treat and monitor Moses after the surgery; 
she was released into the care of her family 
physician in November of 1977. Moses 
then brought suit against Albert Einstein, 
alleging that the negligent care she had 
received there necessitated the total hyster-
ectomy. 
In her complaints, Moses alleged, inter 
alia, that because her treating physician, 
Dr. Krane, had agreed to help defense 
counsel in preparing the case for Albert 
Einstein Medical Center, he breached the 
duty of confidentiality owed to her as his 
patient. Moses also alleged that informa-
tion given by Krane to the effect that she 
suffered from venereal disease, specifically 
gonorrhea, rather than pelvic inflammatory 
disease, was defamatory. Appellees Dr. 
Krane, Underwriters' Adjusting Company, 
Albert Einstein Medical Center, and Daniel 
T. McWilliams moved for summary judg-
ment and for judgment on the pleadings. 
Those motions were granted by the trial 
court, and a consolidated appeal followed. 
After consideration of that appeal, a panel 
of this court determined that because this 
case involves issues of first impression in 
this Commonwealth, and of great societal 
and legal import, it should be certified for 
en banc review. 
Moses' allegations on appeal raise two 
issues before this court. Her first three 
arguments deal with the establishment of a 
cause of action in tort for a physician's 
breach of his confidential relationship with 
his patient. Moses argues, first, that such 
a cause of action should exist; secondly, 
that a physician's judicially unsupervised 
and unauthorized communications should 
give rise to that cause of action; and lastly, 
that in such a context the defense of abso-
lute privilege should not be available to 
that physician. Moses' last two arguments 
concern her claim for defamation and are 
intertwined with the physician/patient con-
fidentiality theory. She argues that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment before depositions were concluded, 
and also that the appellees should not be 
accorded the absolute privilege defense 
where the patient's confidentiality rights 
have been breached. 
The majority refuses to create a new 
cause of action in this Commonwealth for a 
physician's breach of confidentiality in a 
physician/patient relationship. Instead, it 
confines itself to what it terms "the narrow 
factual context of this case." I am of the 
opinion that the policies and principles of 
this Commonwealth require the recognition 
of a cause of action for breach of the 
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physician/patient relationship. Further, I 
strongly disagree with the majority's con-
clusion that the filing of the underlying 
tort action which placed the patient's condi-
tion in issue is sufficient to permit the ex 
parte disclosure of information revealed by 
the patient to his or her doctor as a result 
of that confidential relationship. 
The issue of whether or not a patient 
should be accorded a cause of action for a 
physician's breach of confidentiality is a 
case of first impression in this Common-
wealth. The majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered this issue have allowed the 
claim. Only one jurisdiction has held that 
the cause of action should not be available. 
In Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 
389 S.W.2d 249 (1965), the Tennessee Su-
preme Court refused to alter the common 
law rule existing in that state which held 
that neither a patient nor a physician had a 
privilege to refuse to disclose in court or to 
a third person a communication of one to 
the other. Id. at 655, 389 S.W.2d at 251. 
After examining the statutes of that state, 
the court held that it could find nothing 
which would allow a cause of action in the 
face of the common law rule. It stated 
that that state's licensing statutes and stat-
utes defining ethical conduct were merely 
administrative provisions. Id. at 656, 389 
S.W.2d at 251-52. It held further that 
statutes concerning evidentiary privileges 
were just that, and did not bolster appel-
lant's argument that a cause of action 
should exist. According to the court, "the 
petitioner is trying to base a cause of ac-
tion upon a rule of evidence." Id. at 657, 
389 S.W.2d at 252. 
After considering the case law from oth-
er jurisdictions, I would conclude that the 
better reasoned approach is to allow such a 
cause of action. I do not think that a 
claimant's argument in such a case would 
be based upon a rule of evidence. It is 
rather based upon a relationship that has 
for centuries been accorded the highest 
degree of sanctity by the profession itself, 
as well as by society as a whole. In deter-
mining whether this relationship should 
give rise to a cause of action, I would 
follow the lead of the District of Columbia 
court in Vassiliades v. GarfinckeVs, 
Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C.App.1985), 
and examine Pennsylvania's licensing stat-
utes, evidentiary rules and privileged com-
munications statutes, common law princi-
ples of trust, and the Hippocratic Oath and 
principles of medical ethics. Vassiliades, 
492 A.2d at 590. Moses had cited all these 
possible sources of public policy in her com-
plaint. 
The physician/patient relationship was 
first articulated in the Fifth Century, B.C. 
in the Hippocratic Oath of the medical pro-
fession. It states in pertinent part that: 
Whatever in connection with my profes-
sional practice or not in connection with 
it I see or hear in the life of men which 
ought not to be spoken abroad I will not 
divulge as recommending that all such 
should be kept secret. 
As the Oath demonstrates, for over two 
thousand years, physicians have recognized 
a duty to protect the confidences of their 
patients, and society has tacitly relied upon 
that principle. 
The AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, 
adopted in 1977, show the continuing vitali-
ty of this obligation. The principles pro-
vide that "[a] physician shall respect the 
rights of patients, of colleagues, and of 
other health professionals, and shall safe-
guard patient confidences within the con-
straints of the law." 
Further, the Current Opinions of the Judi-
cial Council of the AMA also reflects these 
values. Section 5.05 of the Opinions states: 
The information disclosed to a physician 
during the course of the relationship be-
tween physician and patient is confiden-
tial to the greatest possible degree — 
The physician should not reveal confiden-
tial communications or information with-
out the express consent of the patient, 
unless required to do so by law. 
Section 5.07 states: 
Both the protection of confidentiality and 
the appropriate release of information in 
records is the rightful expectation of the 
patient. A physician should respect the 
patient's expectations of confidentiality 
concerning medical records that involve 
the patient's care and treatment. 
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These ethical directives illustrate the man-
ner in which the medical profession views 
the divulgence of confidences made to a 
physician by his patient. 
These considerations, however, are not 
merely ethical objectives to which the medi-
cal community aspires Public pohcv I inn 
rors these considerations in licensing regu-
lations and testimonial privilege statutes. 
State legislation codifies the result of socie 
ty's balance of policies promoting full dis-
closure of patient confidences in a judicial 
setting, and protecting the patient's inter 
est in complete non-disclosure. See, e.g 
Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 955 (Ala 
1984). The narrow exceptions which seem 
to typify this type of legislation illustrate 
the great weight attached to non-disclo 
sure. See, e.g., Hope v. Landau, 21 Mass. 
App. 240, 241, 486 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1985) 
Testimonial privilege statutes as well as 
statutes concerning licensing of physicians 
have played a significant role in the accept-
ance by most states of the breach of confi-
dentiality cause of action. See Home v. 
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 706, 287 So.2d 824, 
827 (1973) (those states which had enacted 
a physician/patient testimonial privilege 
statute were almost uniform in allowing 
the cause of action for breach of confiden 
tiality, those which had not enacted such a 
statute were split on that issue); see also 
Vassiliades, supra; Geisberger i Wil-
luhn, 72 Ill.App.3d 435, 436, 28 Ill.Dec. 586, 
588, 390 N.E.2d 945, 947 (1979); Alberts v. 
Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 65-66, 479 N.E.2d 
113, 119 (1985); MacDonald v. dinger, 84 
A.D.2d 482, 484, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 
(1982); Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 NJ.Super 
392, 396, 476 A.2d 1279, 1281 (1984); Hum 
1. Although public policy is a somewhat elusi\e 
concept, the Ohio Supreme Court defined it suc-
cinctly m Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St 
Louis R.R. Co v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St 64 US 
N.E 505 (1916)-
In substance, it may be said to be the commu-
nity common sense and common conscience, 
extended and applied throughout the state to 
matters of public morals, public health, public 
safety, public welfare and the like It is that 
general and well settled public opinion relat-
ing to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow-
men, having due regard to all the circum 
stances of each particular relation and situa 
tion 
phers v. First National Bank, 298 Or. 706, 
718-719, 696 P.2d 527, 535 (1985). Accord 
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, 797 (N.D.Ohio E D 
1965) (applying Ohio law). 
Pennsylvania has a testimonial privilege 
statute which promotes the confidentiality 
of patient/physician communications 42 
Pa.C.S. § 5929 states: 
; 5929. Physicians not to disclose in-
formation 
No physician shall be allowed, m an) civil 
matter, to disclose any information which 
he acquired in attending the patient in a 
professional capacity, and which was nec-
essary to enable him to act in that capaci-
ty, which shall tend to blacken the char-
acter of the patient, without consent of 
said patient, except in civil matters 
brought by such patient for damages on 
account of personal injuries 
42 Pa.CS. § 5929. The Commonwealth has 
also promulgated licensing statutes to pro-
vide its citizens with the best possible medi-
cal care. To this end, disciplinary or cor-
rective measures may be imposed by the 
licensing board upon a physician if he or 
she is "guilty of immoral or unprofessional 
conduct. Unprofessional conduct shall in-
clude departure from or failing to conform 
to an ethical or quality standard of the 
profession The ethical standards of a 
profession are those ethical tenets which 
are embraced by the professional communi-
ty in this Commonwealth." 63 P.S. 
§ 422.41(8) & (8)(i) 
In Pennsylvania, therefore, ethical con-
siderations are not merely aspirational, 
they present a duty to practicing physi-
cians, although no legal liability attaches 
Sometimes such public policy is declared by 
Constitution, sometimes by statute, some-
times by judicial decision. More often, how-
ever, it abides only in the customs and con-
ventions of the people—in their clear con-
sciousness and conviction of what is naturally 
and inherently just and right between man 
and man. 
Public policy is the cornerstone—the foun-
dation—of all Constitutions, statutes, and judi-
cial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, 
its height and its depth, greater than any or all 
of them. 
Id. at 68, 115 N.E. at 507 
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statutorily as a result of the breach of 'that 
duty. We are then faced with the question 
of whether disciplinary sanctions such as 
suspension of a license are sufficient to 
protect the policies involved here. The ma-
jority indicates that disciplinary action 
should be adequate and appropriate. I dis-
agree. Consideration of those policies indi-
cates that more is needed than administra-
tive sanctions, because more than health is 
involved. 
It is true that the argument for prevent-
ing full disclosure of patient confidences 
centers on the health of the individual: 
Any time a doctor undertakes the treat-
ment of a patient, and the consensual 
relationship of physician and patient is 
established, two jural obligations (of sig-
nificance here) are simultaneously as-
sumed by the doctor. Doctor and patient 
enter into a simple contract, the patient 
hoping that he will be cured, and the 
doctor optimistically assuming that he 
wi)) be compensated. As an implied con-
dition of that contract . . . , the doctor 
warrants that any confidential informa-
tion gained through the relationship will 
not be released without the patient's per-
mission. 
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801. This 
promise may be justifiably relied upon by 
the patient. "Almost every member of the 
public is aware of the promise of discretion 
contained in the Hippocratic Oath, and ev-
ery person has a right to rely upon this 
warranty of silence." Id. A patient lays 
bare the sanctum sanctorum of his physical 
and psychological self to his physician in 
his belief in the integrity of this promise. 
In many cases, he has no choice if he 
wishes to be healed. If the physician then 
breaks his vow, and divulges these confi-
dences, he outrages the very foundation of 
society's concept of the physician as healer. 
While it is obvious that effective medical 
treatment is essential to the health and 
well-being of both society and its members, 
the concern for confidentiality in the rela-
tionship goes beyond these considerations: 
When a patient seeks out a doctor and 
retains him, he must admit him to the 
most private part, of the material domain 
of man. Nothing material is more impor-
tant or more intimate to man than the 
health of his mind and body. Since the 
iayman is unfamiliar with the road to 
recovery, he cannot sift the circumstanc-
es of his life and habits to determine 
what is information pertinent to his 
health. As a consequence, he must dis-
close all information in his consultations 
with his doctor—even that which is em-
barrassing, disgraceful or incriminating. 
To promote full disclosure, the medical 
profession extends the promise of secre-
cy The candor which this promise 
elicits is necessary to the effective pur-
suit of health; there can be no reticence, 
no reservation, no reluctance when pa-
tients discuss their problems with their 
doctors. But the disclosure is certainly 
intended to be private. 
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 801-802. See 
also Alberts, 395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d 
at 118; Hague v. Williams, 37 NJ. 328, 
335-36, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962); Berry v. 
Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 196, 331 P.2d 814, 
817 (1958). Society is concerned not mere-
ly with the health of the community, but 
with the dignity and privacy of its mem-
bers. That dignity and privacy are violated 
where the fiduciary relationship between a 
patient and physician—a relationship built 
on the highest expectation of trust—is be-
trayed. 
This court has already expressed its con-
cern over the "total" care of the patient 
and our disapproval of any interference 
with the relationship between physician 
and patient. In Alexander v. Knight, 197 
Pa.Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962), the plain-
tiff wife had suffered whiplash in a car 
accident. During litigation, her doctor re-
leased information without her consent to 
the doctor hired by defendant to interview 
him. We adopted the trial court's opinion 
m that case. Even though that court did 
not find that incident necessary to the dis-
position of the case, it was nonetheless 
disturbed by the actions of both doctors: 
We are of the opinion that members of a 
profession, especially the medical profes-
sion, stand in a confidential or fiduciary 
capacity as to their patients. They owe 
their patients more than just medical 
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care for which payment is exacted; there 
is a duty of total care; that includes and 
comprehends a duty to aid the patient in 
litigation, to render reports when neces-
sary, and to attend court when needed. 
That further includes a duty to refuse 
affirmative assistance to the patient's an-
tagonist in litigation. The doctor, of 
course, owes a duty to his conscience to 
speak the truth; he need, however, speak 
only at the proper time [I]nducing 
. . . [the] breach of . . . a confidential 
relationship [between a doctor and pa 
tient] is to be and is condemned. 
Knight, 177 A.2d at 1462. In this Com-
monwealth, then, public policy, or as the 
Ohio Supreme Court has defined it, the 
"clear consciousness and conviction of 
what is naturally and inherently just and 
right between man and man/' Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati Chicago and St Louis R.R. 
Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 68, 115 N.E. 
505, 507 (1916), envisions that the physician 
owes a duty of a fiduciary, of trust and 
faith to his patient, and, in justice, the 
patient should reasonably be able to rely 
upon that duty. 
I would find, therefore, that there must 
be a legal remedy allowed the patient in 
such a case in order to emphasize the im-
portance of the physician/patient relation-
ship and to protect the dignity of the rela-
tionship as well as the health of the patient 
Public policy in this Commonwealth and 
society's obvious valuation of the relation-
ship in question demands this result. 
The next consideration must be to define 
the parameters of this cause of action so 
that they are inclusive enough to serve 
these purposes. Initially, I would note that 
I agree with those jurisdictions that have 
found that this claim is brought in tort, 
rather than in contract law. Relegating a 
plaintiff to a cause of action in contract 
would severely limit the damages which 
could be recovered. MacDonald, 84 A.D. 
2d at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804. Further, 
w e have already recognized the importance 
of the fiduciary aspect of the physician/pa-
tient relationship in Alexander v. Knight, 
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supra. Although that relationship is par-
tially founded in a contract between patient 
and physician from which evolves a fiduci-
ary duty and an expectation of confidential-
ity, I am in agreement with the courts of 
Massachusetts and New York which have 
stated: "We believe that the relationship 
contemplates an additional duty springing 
from but extraneous to the contract, and 
that the breach of such duty is actionable 
as a tort." MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 486, 
446 N.Y.S.2d at 804; see also Alberts, 395 
Mass at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 120 (contractual 
relationship gives rise to a duty of confi-
dentiality). 
As a cause of action, in tort, the plaintiff 
must then establish the four elements of a 
prima facie case—a duty, breach of that 
duty, causation, and damages. The duty 
arises out of the existence of the relation-
ship between patient and physician. Moses 
has alleged the existence of that duty; she 
states in her complaint that Dr. Krane was 
her treating physician, and that those stat-
utes and ethical considerations that we 
have discussed created a duty of confiden-
tiality which should not have been violated. 
What we are concerned with here is not 
plaintiffs ability to show that a duty ex-
ists, but with defendant's justification for 
the breach. Those jurisdictions that have 
accepted the cause of action for breach of 
confidentiality have noted that the duty is 
not absolute, since the statutory testamen-
tary privilege is not absolute. Where dis-
closure of information is important for the 
safety of the individual or is in the public 
interest, then the doctor may reveal those 
confidences without liability. See Hum-
phers, 298 Or. at 720, 696 P.2d at 535; see 
also Home, 291 Ala. at 709, 287 So.2d at 
830; Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d 
at 124; MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 487, 446 
N.Y.S.2d at 805; Berry, 8 Utah 2d at 196, 
331 P.2d at 817; accord Hammonds, 243 
F.Supp. at 801. 
Further, as with the testimonial privi 
lege, where the patient is shown to have 
consented to the disclosure, the physician 
may not be held liable for making it. See, 
2 •7!A'r. -At- djr pr . ; -h rial court's opin-
nai opinir" is not rep tried at 197 Pa.Su 
per. 79, 177 A 2d 142, howevei It nia/j • 'be 
found at 25 Pa.D. & C.2d 649. 
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e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 
148 Ill.App.3d 581, 590, 102 Ill.Dec. 172, 
177, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (1986) cert denied 
sub nom. Tobin v. Petrillo, — U.S. , 
107 S.Ct. 3232, 97 L.Ed.2d 738 (1987); Al-
berts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124; 
Landau, 21 Mass.App. at 241, 486 N.E.2d 
at 90; Hague, 37 N J . at 336, 181 A.2d at 
349; Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc.2d 148, 
150, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (1979) affd 
mem., 73 A.D.2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 
(1979) That consent may be expressly giv-
en, as in a writing. Here the issue re-
volves around the question of implied con-
sent 
Most states have held that when a pa-
tient files a law suit in which her medical 
condition is placed in issue, she has impli-
edly consented to the disclosure of informa-
tion which had been confidential. She has 
waived her privilege which prevents her 
doctor from testifying. See 42 Pa.C.S. 
§ 5929; Dennie v. University of Pitts-
burgh School of Medicine, 638 F.Supp. 
1005, 1008 (W.D.Pa.1986) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); see also Bond v. District 
Court, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984) (en 
banc); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 
405, 407, 240 N.W.2d 333, 335 (1976); Jaap 
v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389, 1391 
(Mont.1981); Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 
106, 109, 534 A.2d 720, 722 (1987). The 
rationale behind this policy is that it is 
inconsistent for a patient litigant to base a 
claim upon his medical condition and then 
use the privilege to prevent the opposing 
party from obtaining and presenting con-
flicting evidence pertaining to that condi-
tion. Bond, 682 P.2d at 38. 
The same considerations apply in a situa 
tion where a patient is attempting to bring 
a suit against her physician for breach of 
the duty of confidentiality. In a sense, this 
is similar to a medical malpractice action 
where the physician being sued must be 
allowed to testify about the patient's condi-
tion in order to put his version of the facts 
before the jury. Panko v. Consolidated 
Mutual Insurance Co., 423 F.2d 41, 44 
(3rd Cir.1970) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
Other courts have handled these situations 
in similar manners. The majority of juris-
dictions have held that a patient waives his 
right to a physician's full confidentiality 
when he puts his medical condition into 
issue in a law suit: 
[An] . . . exception[ ] [to the physician's 
duty of confidentiality] arises where . . . 
the physical condition of the patient is 
made an element of a claim . . . [even 
when] that claim has not yet been 
pressed to litigation [T]he same pol-
icy which during litigation permits, even 
demands disclosure of information ac-
quired during the course of the physi-
cian-patient relationship allows the dis-
closure thereof to the person against 
whom the claim is being made, when 
recovery is sought prior to or without 
suit. At this point the public interest in 
an honest and just result assumes dom-
inance over the individual's right of non-
disclosure. 
Hague, 37 N.J at 336, Ihl A.2d at 349. 
See also Mull v. String, 448 So.2d 952, 954 
(Ala.1984); Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127 
Misc.2d 124, 126, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 
(Sup.1985); accord Hammonds, 243 
F.Supp. at 800. Once a patient puts his 
condition into issue, he is recognizing that 
his dignity and privacy are no longer of 
paramount importance. The balance of 
concerns is settled on the side of disclosure. 
We are then faced with the question of how 
to resolve the balance when, although the 
patient has placed his medical condition 
into issue, his physician, without his knowl-
edge or actual consent, enters into an ex 
parte interview with the defendant's attor-
ney. 
I atn persuaded by the reasoning of 
those jurisdictions which forbid such inter-
views because to sanction such interviews 
would be to vitiate the physician/patient 
privilege. While the testimonial privilege 
may be waived to a limited extent by the 
patient litigant's placing her medical condi-
tion in issue, to say that the relationship is 
"waived" means nothing: 
"Waiver" does not authorize a private 
conference between a doctor and a de-
fense lawyer. It is one thing to say that 
a doctor may be examined and cross-ex-
amined by the defense in a courtroom, in 
conformity with the rules of evidence, 
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with the vigilant surveillance of plain- one of his treating doctors 
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tiffs counsel, and the careful scrutiny of 
the trial judge; it is quite another matter 
to permit, as alleged here, an unsuper-
vised conversation between the doctor 
and and his patient's protagonist 
[T]he mere waiver of a testimonial privi-
lege does not release the doctor from his 
duty of secrecy and from his duty of 
loyalty in litigation and no one may be 
permitted to induce the breach of these 
duties. 
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp. at 805. To ap-
proach the analysis from the perspective of 
"waiver" does not resolve the problem of 
how to balance competing interests here. 
Some jurisdictions when faced with this 
question in an action for personal injuries 
or medical malpractice suits have held that 
ex parte interviews are proper. See Arctic 
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d 
1006 (Alaska 1977); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 
450 So.2d 858 (Fla.1984); State ex rel 
Stufflebam v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 882 
(Mo.App.1985); Lazorick v. Brown, 195 
N J . Super. 444, 480 A.2d 223 (1984). Ac-
cord Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 
126 (D.D.C.1983). There are several ratio-
nales behind this rule. Several of these 
jurisdictions have found that no statutory 
or common law prohibition against ex parte 
interviews exists, and so have refused to 
prohibit them in these situations. Coral-
luzzo, 450 So.2d at 859. Other courts have 
pointed out that no party has a proprietary 
right to evidence. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d 
at 888; accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 
at 128. For the most part, however, juris-
dictions which permit ex parte interviews 
have focused on time and cost restraints. 
They base their holdings on the misconcep-
tion that ex parte interviews are less costly 
and time consuming than the alternative 
method, that is, formal discovery. Trans-
World Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 
1148, 1152 (Alaska 1976); Lazorick, 195 
N.J. Super, at 454-455, 480 A.2d at 229; 
accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D at 128. 
In State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appel-
quist, supra, a Missouri court prohibited a 
judge from denying a motion to compel the 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to 
authorize the defendant's interview with 
That court, 
quoting extensively from Doe v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., supra, found that ex parte inter-
views were less costly than depositions and 
easier to schedule. It also found that such 
interviews were more conducive to sponta-
neity and candor, and therefore more desir-
able. According to the Missouri court, an 
ex parte interview was a cost-efficient way 
in which to eliminate unnecessary witness-
es. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d at 888. See 
also Lazorick, 195 N J.Super. at 455, 480 
A.2d at 229; accord Eli Lilly & Co., 99 
F.R.D. at 128 
In Lazorick v. Brorvn, supra, the New 
Jersey Superior Court held that the plain-
tiff in a medical malpractice case should be 
required to sign a waiver allowing the de-
fendant to discuss her condition with treat-
ing physicians citing the excessive cost of 
formal discovery. That court pointed out 
that the discovery rules were not the only 
methods by which discovery could be con-
ducted. Further, the court refused to as-
sume that defense counsel would take ad-
vantage of the absence of plaintiffs coun-
sel at such an interview to elicit privileged 
information. Lazorick, 195 NJ.Super. at 
455-56, 480 A.2d at 229. The court stated 
that even though it might be considered 
unjust for a doctor to "go over to another 
camp," that doctor should be allowed to 
serve justice as he saw it, or, as in this 
case, to help another doctor. Id. "The 
justice system should [not be made to] pay 
this price so that the doctor-patient rela-
tionship will not be bruised." Id. at 456, 
480 A.2d at 230. 
In Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, the 
federal district court for the District of 
Columbia cited all these reasons in finding 
that a plaintiff was required to authorize 
the interview between her treating physi-
cian and defense counsel It went on to 
express concern over the possibility that 
the testimonial privilege, if extended to ex 
parte interviews, could become a trial tac-
tic, allowing plaintiffs counsel to monitor 
the progress of the defense: 
The privilege was never intended to 
be used as a trial tactic by which a party 
entitled to invoke it may control to his 
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advantage the timing and circumstances 
of the release of information he must 
inevitably see revealed at some time. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. at 128. 
The majority indicates that it, too, is con 
cerned with time and costs. I, howe\ er, 
agree with those courts that have forbid-
den ex parte interviews of treating physi-
cians by adverse parties, regardless of 
costs, on the basis that they are violative of 
public policy. See Mull, 448 So.2d at 955; 
Petrillo, 148 Ill.App.3d at 593, 102 Ill.Dec. 
at 177, 499 N.E.2d at 957; Wenninger, 307 
Minn, at 410-11, 240 N.W.2d at 337; Jaap, 
623 P.2d at 1392; Nelson, 130 N.H. at 111, 
534 A.2d at 723; Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 
358, 360, 743 P.2d 114, 116 (1987); Stoller 
v. Moo Young Jun, 118 A.D.2d 637, 637, 
499 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (1986); Anker, 98 
Misc. 2d at 152-153, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 584; 
Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash.2d 675, 677, 
756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988); accord Manion v. 
N.P.W. Medical Center, 676 F.Supp. 585, 
594-95 (M.D.Pa.1987). I am aware that 
most of these cases involve evidentiary con-
cerns rather than theories of liability in 
tort, but I would find their reasoning in-
structive and applicable to the present situ-
ation. The presence of plaintiffs counsel 
at an interview between the plaintiffs phy-
sician and defense counsel prevents the 
inadvertent disclosure of irrelevant infor-
mation which may overstep the boundaries 
of the privilege and lead to the discovery of 
embarrassing and harmful information. 
Roosevelt Hotel Limited Partnership v. 
Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986). 
Wenninger, 307 Minn, at 411, 240 N.W.2d 
at 337; Nelson, 130 N.H. at 111, 534 A.2d 
at 723; Anker, 98 Misc.2d at 152-153, 413 
N.Y.S.2d at 585; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 
677, 756 P.2d at 140. 
Further, I note, as did the Illinois court 
in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 
supra, w hich I would find most persuasive, 
that concern with excessive discovery time 
and costs is also misplaced. Depositions 
are not the only way in which a defendant 
can conduct discovery aside from the ex 
parte interview. As the Petrillo court not-
ed, methods of formal discovery may just 
as easily serve the purpose. Petrillo, 148 
IU.App.3d at 596-97, 102 Ill.Dec. at 183, 
499 N.E.2d at 963; Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360, 
743 P.2d at 116; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 
677, 756 P.2d at 140. I also am in disagree-
ment with statements that refusal to allow 
ex parte interviews in some way presents a 
tactical advantage to the plaintiff. I do not 
believe that requiring compliance with for-
mal discovery methods gives plaintiffs the 
ability to somehow uncover the defense's 
trial strategy, any more than it would in 
any other cause of action. As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court stated, "[T]he argu-
ment that depositions unfairly allow plain-
tiffs to determine defendants' trial strate-
gy does not comport with a purpose behind 
the discovery rules—to prevent surprise at 
trial." Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 680, 756 
P.2d at 142. 
In any case, I agree with both the Illinois 
and the Washington courts that the time 
consumed as well as the costs involved in 
formal discovery do not create such a hard-
ship here as to require us to allow ex parte 
interviews. I fail to see how allowance of 
ex parte interviews would in any way lead 
to truth in the litigation process. I agree 
with the Illinois court that the doctor's 
opinion in an ex parte interview should not 
differ from that expressed at a deposition 
or in interrogatories. Petrillo, 148 Ill.App. 
3d at 597, 102 Ill.Dec. at 183, 499 N.E.2d at 
963; see also Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360, 743 
P.2d at 116. Allowing an ex parte inter-
view in no way balances properly the con-
cerns of both parties and of public policy. 
I find that such concerns are more appro-
priately met by requiring that formal dis-
covery methods be followed. 
Of course, counsel are free to agree to 
methods of discovery, if they so choose. I 
would note with approval the requirement 
of the Alaska Supreme Court in Arctic 
Motor Freight that "counsel . . . confer in 
good faith concerning discovery . . . , [that 
they] exchange information and comply 
with discovery requests 'in a manner dem-
onstrating candor and common sense.'" 
Arctic Motor Freight, Inc., 571 P.2d at 
1009 (quoting Trans-World Investments v. 
Drobny, 554 P.2d at 1152). I am hard 
pressed to understand how that is to occur, 
however, in situations like the one present-
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ly before uu, win it neither the appellant 
nor her counsel was aware of the inter-
view, and where the patient-litigant's physi-
cian rushes to the aid of defense counsel. 
Further, 1 am convinced that ex parte 
interviews are improper because the ratio-
nales utilized by those jurisdictions allow-
ing such interviews do not address the 
heart of the problem, that is, the violation 
of the fiduciary duty that a physician owes 
his patient. Any attempt to balance com-
peting interests must take this into if 
count. 
Private nonadversary interviews oJ a 
doctor bv adverse counsel would offer no 
.. protection to the patient's right of 
privacy The presence of the patient's 
counsel at the doctor's interrogation per-
mits the patient to know what his testi-
mony is, allays a patient's fears that his 
doctor may be disclosing personal confi-
dences, and thus helps preserve the com-
plete trust between doctor and patient 
which is essential to the successful treat-
ment of the patient's condition. 
Wenninger, 307 Mum al 411, 240 N 1 M 
at 337. See also Ashby, 106 N.M. at 360, 
743 P.2d at 116; Loudon, 110 Wash.2d at 
679 156 P.2d at 141 Beyond allowing for 
the successful treatment of the patient, the 
ability to be present, in actuality or 
through counsel, preserves the trust of \\w 
patient in his or her chosen physician. It 
removes the concern for trespass to the 
patient's dignity and psyche, a concern 
which strikes at the heart of this fiduciary 
relationship. 
The appellees, Dr Krane, Albert Em 
stein, and Underwriters, all argue that 
these facts will not support Moses' claim 
for breach of confidentiality because any 
statements made in connection with litiga-
tion or pending litigation are absolutely 
privileged in a defamation context. Binder 
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 
323, 275 A.2d 53, 56 (1971). Appellees ar-
gue that since the breach of confidentiality 
claim arises from the same set of facts 
which are asserted as giving rise to the 
defamation claim, the privilege should ap-
ply as a complete defense to that claim as 
well. They cite to us a series of cases from 
our own and other jurisdictions which they 
advance as having extended the concept of 
absolute privilege for statements arining in 
litigation to causes of action oth^r than 
defamation, see, e.g., Thompson vt Sikov 
340 Pa.Super. 382, 490 A.2d 472 (l»85) 
(statements did not give rise to cnune of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because privileged under f 4g 
comment g, of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts); Passon v. Spritzer, 277 Pa.Super 
498, 419 A.2d 1258 (1980) (absolute privi-
lege applied to allegedly libellouM utate-
ments contained in petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus); Triester v. 191 Tenant* As-
sociation, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 415 A,2d 698 
(1979) (statements did not give rise to cause 
of action for disparagement of title because 
privileged under Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 635). 
At first glance, it would seem thai appel-
lees have set out a plausible argument for 
expansion of the privileges connected with 
defamation to the present cause of action. 
A closer examination of the cases cited and 
of the Restatement (Second) of Tortu, upon 
which they in some part rely, negate* this 
impression, however The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts outlines the absolute priv-
ileges available in actions for defamution in 
sections 583 to 592A. These sections are 
given wider application by section* 635 
(making the privileges available in uotions 
for injurious falsehood) and 652F (milking 
the privileges available in actions for inva-
sion of privacy), and apply to w i t n e s s 
jurors, parties to judicial proceedings, 
judges, legislators, administrative officers 
husbands and wives, and attorneys \\\ | u w 
With the exception of the section drilling 
with husbands and wives, these Htvtmns 
give to persons in the described m|rH a 
privilege to publish otherwise actionable 
material as some part of a judicial or Ir^m-
lative proceeding in which the permit,
 w|l() 
asserts the privilege is involved str id 
§§ 585-592. This "privilege," which ,„
 uc . 
tually in the nature of an immunit\ i r o m 
suit, see 3 Restatement (Second) oi rorts 
§ 585, Introductory Note, has the effort of 
providing insulation from liability fot Mfnte-
ments which are related to a judmu! or 
legislative proceeding, but would In
 w, tmn_ 
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able if made in another context. Nothing 
in the cases cited by appellees or in the 
Restatement sections outlining this immu-
nity, however, addresses its applicability in 
respected confidential relationship between 
the declarant and the individual who is the 
subject of the statements, the subject has a 
countervailing privilege which would pro-
hibit the declarant from making statements 
violative of his duty to the subject, even in 
court. The attachment, whether by com-
mon law tradition or legislative enactment, 
of such a privilege to the confidential rela-
tionship recognizes a public policy favoring 
the relationship which outweighs even the 
policy to promote truth-finding in judicial 
and legislative proceedings. 
Appellees would have us hold that the 
absolute immunity doctrine is widening. I 
do not think it has widened so far as to 
encompass this cause of action which I 
would espouse. Consider the most recent 
cases appellees cite to us from this court, 
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.Super. 422, 536 
A.2d 1337 (1987) and Brown v. Delaware 
Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa.Stf-
per. 629, 632, 539 A.2d 1372, 1374 (1988). 
While these cases do hold that the immuni-
ty insulates attorneys from liability for in-
tentional torts against third parties based 
upon actions which were performed in a 
judicial context, they do not stand for the 
proposition that the immunity would apply 
if the tort alleged were based upon actions 
taken by the attorney against his own 
client. Thus appellees' arguments based 
on Pelagatti and Brown fail to convince us 
that the absolute immunity doctrine must 
swallow up any cause of action for breach 
of confidentiality in a judicial setting. This 
is underlined by the Restatement section 
discussing the absolute liability for attor-
neys during a judicial proceeding. Com-
ment a to section 586 states, "The privilege 
stated in this Section is based upon a public 
policy of securing to attorneys as officers 
of the court the utmost freedom in their 
efforts to secure justice for their clients." 
3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 586 (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
Further, an examination of these Re-
statement sections shows that public policy 
considerations behind the absolute privilege 
doctrine have, in most jurisdictions, been 
considered and discarded in favor of confi-
dentiality in such situations. The doctrine 
oi fetooYofce prrotege ISVDTB ixiYi ftBttosxiTe 
on the part of witnesses or potential wit-
nesses in a litigation setting: 
This privilege exists in favor of counsel 
so that he will be permitted to represent 
his client's interests to the fullest extent 
. . . All persons involved in a judicial 
proceeding are encouraged by this privi-
lege to speak frankly and argue freely 
without danger or concern that they may 
be required to defend their statements in 
a later defamation action. 
Smith v. Griffiths, 327 Pa.Super. 418, 423, 
476 A.2d 22, 25 (1984). This was the ratio-
nale behind the Pelagatti decision. Pela-
gatti, 370 Pa.Super. at 436, 536 A.2d at 
1344. In contrast, as has already been 
discussed, the public policy of this Com-
monwealth has attempted to balance the 
competing concerns of the desirability in a 
Wtigation setting oi ixiY> Qisc^ DBxtre \*y a 
physician -against the patient litigant's de-
sire for no disclosure whatsoever. The ex-
istence of a statute which provides for lim-
ited disclosure in a litigation context is 
illustrative of finding that balance in favor 
of limiting disclosure. The balance there-
fore favors the rights of the patient liti-
gant. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinck-
el's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 
App.1985) (existence of licensing statute, 
which prevents disclosure except for situa-
tions involving gunshot wounds, and evi-
dentiary code, which precludes testifying 
except in limited situations, found not appli-
cable, illustrative of public policy encourag-
ing patient candor and physician confiden-
tiality). Because we attach great weight to 
the fiduciary duty that the physician owes 
to his patient, we have found that a cause 
of action should exist where that confi-
dence is breached, especially where the 
physician has engaged in ex parte confer-
ences: 
At the very heart of every fiduciary rela-
tionship, including that between a patient 
and his physician, there exists an atmo-
sphere of trust and faith in the discretion 
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of the fiduciary. That being so, we find 
it difficult to believe that a physician can 
engage in an ex parte conference with 
the legal adversary of his patient without 
endangering the trust and faith invested 
in him by his patient 
Petrillo, 148 Ill.App.3d at 595, 102 Ill.Dec. 
at 182, 499 N.E.2d at 962. To hold that an 
absolute privilege should exist here would 
be to advance the importance of disclosure 
over trust and faith, and would eviscerate 
the very relationship we have set out to 
protect. 
I must point out that refusing to apply 
the doctrine of absolute privilege in this 
instance in no way bruises the adversary 
system, a concern of the New Jersey court 
in Lazorick v. Brawn, 195 NJ.Super. at 
456, 480 A.2d at 231. In this Common-
wealth, the balance achieved by the legisla-
ture will not be upset by any decision to 
join those jurisdictions which require for-
mal discovery methods to be followed in 
situations where the physician/patient rela-
tionship is at risk. Obviously, a physician 
who has the consent of his patient would 
not be in danger of any suit here, Baker v. 
Lafayette College, 350 Pa.Super. 68, 72, 
504 A.2d 247, 249 (1986); see 3 Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 583 (1977) (con-
sent is a defense to defamation claim), and 
during formal discovery, sanctioned by the 
court, the patient has clearly given his con-
sent. Such measures balance considera-
tions, because they allow disclosure in con-
trolled situations, and in doing so, protect 
the relationship to which our courts and 
legislature have attached such importance. 
Further, because I would find that the 
physician/patient relationship is so impor-
tant to society, I would also hold that in-
ducing the breach should give rise to a 
cause of action in tort. See, e.g., Alberts, 
395 Mass. at 69, 479 N.E.2d at 119; accord 
Hammonds, 243 F.Supp at 803 Although 
I would not consider this to be a cause of 
action sounding strictly in contract, I note 
that tortious interference with contractual 
relations is also a basis for liability. See 
Buczek v. First National Bank, 366 Pa.Su-
per. 551, 557, 531 A 2d 1122, 1124 (1987) I 
would find this to be analogous to a cause 
of action for inducing the breach of confi-
dentiality. Again, the physician stands in a 
fiduciary relation to his patient See Alex-
ander, 177 A.2d at 146. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts finds that such an induce-
ment is the basis for liability. 
Section 874 defines the violation of a 
fiduciary duty as follows: 
§ 874. Violation of Fiduciary Duty 
One standing in a fiduciary relation with 
another is subject to liability to the other 
for harm resulting from a breach of duty 
imposed by the relation. 
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 874 (ed. 
1979). Comment c to that section states, 
"A person who knowingly assists a fiduci-
ary in committing a breach of trust is him-
self guilty of tortious conduct, and is liable 
for the harm thereby caused." The com-
ment then cites to Section 876 of the Re-
statement, which says, in turn: 
§ 876. Persons Acting in Concert 
For harm resulting to a third person 
from the tortious conduct of another, one 
is subject to liability if he 
(a) does a tortious act in concert with 
another or pursuant to a common design 
with him, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct con-
stitutes a breach of duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to 
the other so to conduct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the 
other in accomplishing a tortious result, 
and his own conduct, separately con-
sidered, constitutes a breach of duty to 
the third person. 
4 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (ed. 
1979). We find subsection b to be control-
ling here. 
Advice or encouragement to act acts as a 
moral support to a tortfeasor, and if the 
act encouraged is known to be tortious it 
has the same effect upon the liability of 
the advisor as participation or physical 
assistance If the encouragement or as-
sistance is a substantial factor in causing 
the resulting tort, the one giving it is 
himself a tortfeasor, and is responsible 
for the consequences of the other's act. 
This is true when the act done is an 
intended trespass . . . when it is merely a 
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negligent act The rule applies whether 
or not the other knows his act is tor-
tious It likewise applies to a person 
who knowingly gives substantial aid to 
another who, as he knows, intends to do 
a tortious act. 
Id. at comment d. 
Considering Moses' allegations, then, in 
the light of this analysis, I would find that 
she has made out a cause of action for 
breach of confidentiality against Dr. 
Krane. Her complaint outlined licensing 
statutes and this Commonwealth's testa-
mentary privilege statute, as well as the 
Hippocratic Oath, and ethical considera-
tions of the AMA. She has alleged that 
Dr. Krane was her treating physician and 
had gathered information about her from 
their physician/patient relationship. She 
has further alleged that because of that 
relationship and because of these statutes 
and considerations, Dr. Krane had a duty 
to remain silent unless she gave her con-
sent. She has alleged that Dr. Krane, 
without informing either counsel or herself> 
upon request by Underwriters, whom she 
alleges was hired by Albert Einstein to 
represent it in the underlying medical mal-
practice action, provided them with infor-
mation and documents, even going so far 
as to testify for them in that trial. I would 
reiterate that this case is in its preliminary 
stages. I would hold that the trial court 
erred in dismissing Moses' complaint on 
preliminary objections. 
The remaining claims for inducement of 
breach were dismissed by the trial court on 
a motion for summary judgment. It is 
axiomatic that summary judgment may be 
granted only where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. The moving party 
will then be entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. Summary judgment 
should be granted, however, only in cases 
where the right to such judgment is clear 
and free from doubt. Consumer Party of 
Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 
158, 175, 507 A.2d 323, 331 (1986). Fur-
ther, the reviewing court must take as true 
all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving 
3. We note also that Moses has alleged damages 
because of injury to her nerves and psyche, 
party's pleadings, giving that party the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from those facts. Curry v. Estate 
of Thompson, 332 Pa.Super. 364, 368, 481 
A.2d 65S, Wb {»&4>. 
Taking as true all well-pleaded facts in 
Moses' complaint, I would find that she has 
made out a cause of action against Albert 
Einstein, Underwriters, and McWilliams for 
inducement of breach as well. Again, she 
has alleged in her complaint that Albert 
Einstein hired Underwriters to represent it, 
and that Underwriters in turn hired McWil-
liams as counsel. She has also alleged that 
Underwriters, through an employee, con-
tacted Dr. Krane, and that Underwriters 
arranged for McWilliams to speak with 
him. She alleged that all actions of the 
employees of Underwriters were done in 
the scope of their employment, and that 
McWilliams performed his duties with the 
consent, approval, knowledge and coopera-
tion of Underwriters. She has further al-
leged that all three appellees initiated, pro-
moted, requested, encouraged and gave fi-
nancial support to the unauthorized com-
munications of Dr. Krane. 
The inference may be drawn from these 
facts that appellees intended to obtain from 
Dr. Krane information that he had obtained 
as a result of his fiduciary relationship 
with Moses. Further, because appellees 
knew that Dr. Krane was Moses' treating 
physician, one may draw the inference that 
they also knew that they were inducing a 
breach of a fiduciary duty by requesting 
and obtaining that information. I think 
that Moses has pled sufficient facts to raise 
the question of whether appellees were per-
forming a tortious act in concert with Dr. 
Krane, or giving substantial assistance to 
him by asking for information protected by 
the physician/patient relationship while be-
ing aware that divulging that information 
was possibly tortious. These questions are 
for the jury to determine. I do not find the 
case to be free of doubt, or the outcome to 
be prescribed by law. I would hold that 
the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the facts that are before us.3 
because of mental distress and embarrassment, 
shame, and humiliation. 
COM. T. HUNSINGER 
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I would find, therefore, that the need of 
a patient's opponent in litigation to obtain 
all information relevant to the patient's 
physical condition does not necessarily 
weigh so heavily against the desire of a 
patient to keep confidential the information 
disclosed during the physician/patient rela-
tionship that we must allow ex parte inter-
views with the physician involved as a re-
sult. I would not assign litigation costs 
and time much value. I would add to the 
balance, however, the public policy of this 
Commonwealth which has always accorded 
great importance to the confidentiality of 
certain fiduciary relationships.4 This addi-
tion, I am certain, would make the balance 
more even, if it did not, as it does to my 
mind, tip the scales to the side of the 
patient 
In any event, I am of the opinion that 
these competing interests can best be 
served, not by permitting unauthorized or 
nonconsensual disclosure of information, 
but, as I have stated, through utilization of 
the discovery process provided for by the 
Commonwealth's rules of court. The su-
pervision and judgment of the trial court, 
allowing discovery of information and pro-
viding sanctions on misconduct, can best 
mitigate the effects of a desire for disclo-
sure on the one hand, and confidentiality on 
the other. Cost is no basis for violating 
the confidentiality of the relationship in-
volved here. 
I would find that the public policy of this 
Commonwealth requires that a patient liti-
gant be permitted to bring a claim against 
his physician for breach of confidentiality, 
and that ex parte discovery methods are 
forbidden in cases in which the physi-
cian/patient relationship is integral, and 
may give rise to a claim for that breach. I 
would therefore reverse the order of the 
trial court granting judgment on the plead-
ings and summary judgment for appellees 
on Moses' claims for breach of confidential-
ity and inducement of that breach, and 
remand for further proceedings in accord-
ance with this opinion. 
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DEL SOLE, Judge, concurring: 
I join the majority in all respects save 
one. I agree that when a patient files a 
lawsuit claiming personal injury, that pa-
tient has consented to the disclosure of 
relevant medical information by treating 
physicians. Therefore, there was no 
breach of the duty of confidentiality by Dr. 
Krane in this case. There being no breach 
of a duty, there can be no claim against the 
remaining defendants for inducing the dis-
closure. Also, I agree that judicial pro-
ceeding immunity would protect all of the 
defendants from claims for defamation. 
I would not reach the issue of whether 
judicial proceeding immunity protects a 
person from liability for breaching a duty 
of confidentiality. It is not necessary to 
address that issue in this case. Also, since 
the claim in a breach of confidentiality case 
is based upon the fact something vms dis-
closed, not what was disclosed, I seriously 
question whether immunity would be avail-
able in those situations. 
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Defendant was convicted in the Court 
of Common Pleas, Montour County, Crimi-
nal Division, No. 106, 1985, Myers, J., of 
driving under the influence. Defendant ap-
pealed. The Superior Court, No. 2820 Phil-
adelphia 1987, Beck, J., held that: (1) evi-
dence that defendant initially refused to 
4. I also note my concern over what effect the 
majority's decision will have on similar confi-
dential relationships, for example, the attor-
ney/client relationship, or 
countant/client relationship. 
the 
